NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 95 | Number 2

Article 4

1-1-2017

Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in Property Law
Eric R. Claeys

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Eric R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in Property Law, 95 N.C. L. Rev. 413 (2017).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol95/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

95 N.C. L. REV. 413 (2017)

LABOR, EXCLUSION, AND FLOURISHING
IN PROPERTY LAW*
ERIC R. CLAEYS**
This Article presents a natural rights justification for property
rights in a theory called “productive labor theory.” Productive
labor theory sets forth a Lockean, labor-based case for property.
It links property to human interests in flourishing—specifically in
interests in using ownable resources to produce constituent
elements of survival or rational improvement. On this
foundation, “labor” means intelligent and purposeful activity
producing goods that contribute to survival or rational
improvement.
This Article presents productive labor theory as an alternative to
the two families of normative theories that currently loom large
in contemporary property scholarship—economic theories of
exclusion and progressive theories. Each of these theory-families
unsettles property in an important respect; productive labor
theory shores up each of the foundations unsettled by exclusion
and progressive theories. Like progressive theories, productive
labor theory links property on a satisfying moral foundation,
namely human flourishing. Unlike progressive theories,
productive labor theory does not denigrate or undermine the role
that exclusive control plays in property. Like leading economic
theories, productive labor theory justifies strong rights of
exclusive control and possession. Yet it avoids standard
criticisms about normative foundations of law and economic
analysis, and it identifies moral boundaries within which
efficiency analyses might be normatively defensible.
The Article illustrates productive labor theory using the prima
facie case for trespass to land; the common law privilege for
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necessity and the defense for adverse possession; Allemansrätt
and statutory rights to roam; state and local landmark schemes,
as exemplified in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York; and regulatory schemes authorizing the use of
eminent domain to condemn and reassign private land for
commercial redevelopment, as exemplified in Kelo v. City of
New London.
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INTRODUCTION
To many scholars, property seems counterintuitive. In his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William Blackstone
famously described property as “that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe.”1 Although Blackstone was almost surely indulging in
rhetorical excess,2 it is no accident that his description has become a
sound bite in recent scholarship. The most familiar property rights
confer on owners powers to exclude others from their possessions.
Property confers such an exclusive power even when non-owners
really need to use the object of property and will not damage it.
“Sole . . . dominion” captures that normative structure; “despotic”
captures how ominous and problematic that structure seems to many
scholars.3
That impression makes property rights hard to justify. An
adequate theory needs to explain why property rights might confer
broad authority on owners, and yet such breadth seems indefensible.

1. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
2. For a collection of ten sources acknowledging as much, see David B. Schorr, How
Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 103, 105 n.6 (2009).
3. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *2.
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The tensions created by these demands may be seen in the two main
families of contemporary property theories.
Consider the first family of theories, “exclusion theories.”
Exclusion theories justify property rights as Blackstonian rights to
exclude on various economic grounds: incentivizing investment and
improvement, protecting subjective owner value, and minimizing
third parties’ information costs in dealing with resources.4 Although
these accounts capture property’s exclusive character, they are
nagged by philosophical doubts. If exclusive property creates wealth,
why does wealth creation justify excluding non-owners from a
resource they desperately need?5 Questions like these have not yet
been addressed satisfactorily in property scholarship.
The second prominent theory-family covers self-styled
“progressive” property theories. Progressive property theories resist
giving economic analysis pride of place in property theory—especially
because of the concern just mentioned, the gap between economic
efficiency and philosophical legitimacy. Progressive theories portray
property as being justified not by efficiency but by moral interests in
well-being or flourishing. Property is messy and context-dependent,
such theories maintain, because it balances “plural and
incommensurable” interests.6 Although these theories avoid the
problems from which exclusion theories suffer, they make it difficult
to justify exclusive property. When property is cast as a right to use a
resource consistent with a range of relevant and plural values, nonowners may claim that they need to use owners’ resources and that
owners have no rights to privilege their own intended uses over the
non-owners’ incommensurable uses. When a judge arbitrates such
claims, property ceases to seem a right; it seems instead a privilege to
use an ownable resource as the judge finds valuable for the entire
community.
Taken together, exclusion and progressive theories seem to leave
property on uneasy foundations. This Article aims to provide a more
4. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 358 (1967); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1352–53
(1993); Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2096–103 (1997); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001); Carol M.
Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2182–85 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in
NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 3 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1982).
6. Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 743, 743 (2009).
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solid foundation. To do so, this Article steps outside these current
debates and presents them from a different perspective—that of John
Locke. There are two reasons for focusing on Locke here. First,
Locke is a fine subject for an article in the North Carolina Law
Review because Locke was involved in preparing The Fundamental
Constitutions of Carolina of 1669.7 Second, and more generally,
Locke’s chapter “Of Property” in his Second Treatise of Government
deserves pride of place in the western legal tradition for making
property a dominant category in legal and political thought.8 Legal
historians acknowledge that it “is difficult to overstate the impact of
the Lockean concept of property” on American property law.9
Property scholars also recognize that Locke “still today [supplies] the
point of departure for most philosophical discussions of property.”10
Of course, as Locke’s theory of property continues to resonate, it
also continues to attract considerable resistance. In many quarters,
Locke’s theory seems “fraught with difficulties,”11 or it “appears in
several versions, most of them deficient in one respect or another.”12
Yet now may be a good time to explore whether these perceptions
are accurate. Outside the legal academy over the last generation,
scholars have begun to rehabilitate labor theory. The key insight from
this philosophical work is that “labor” is most defensible when it
refers to activity in pursuit of a low, solid, and sociable form of
human flourishing—“rational (or purposeful), value-creating
activity . . . directed toward the preservation or comfort of our
being.”13 This Article refers to flourishing-based labor theory as
“productive labor theory.” Productive labor theory is just now gaining
recognition in contemporary legal scholarship.14 Since progressive

7. See JOHN LOCKE, The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, in LOCKE:
POLITICAL ESSAYS 160, 160–61 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997) (1669).
8. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ II.25–.52, at 285–302
(Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1698).
9. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (3d ed. 2008).
10. Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
459, 497 (2009) (citations omitted).
11. Hanoch Dagan, The Public Dimension of Private Property, 24 KING’S L.J. 260, 260
(2013).
12. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 14 (8th ed. 2014).
13. STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY: GROTIUS
TO HUME 151 (1991).
14. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION
TO PROPERTY THEORY 35–51 (2012); Eric R. Claeys, Productive Use in Acquisition,
Accession, and Labour Theory, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW
13, 13–46 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds., 2013). For an earlier work anticipating
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theories of property have raised deep questions about the link
between property and flourishing, that political philosophy work is
extremely relevant to the most urgent questions in legal property
scholarship.
To explain why, this Article makes three specific claims. First,
this Article shows how productive labor theory conceives of and
justifies a property right. Productive labor theory justifies property in
relation to land and tangible personal articles as a presumptive right
of exclusive possession, control, and enjoyment.15 Many scholars
believe that a rights-based theory of property must mandate a right to
exclude non-owners under any circumstances and with no
qualifications.16 Productive labor theory works more subtly and
indirectly. It permits, justifies, and encourages exclusive rights when
such rights seem practically likely to facilitate concurrent labor by
different citizens for different goals.17 Productive labor theory thus
justifies exceptions to exclusive property—when the link between
labor and exclusive control seems very weak, or when the needs of
non-owners seem particularly strong. The two-tiered normative
structure that emerges resembles Henry Smith’s two-tiered portrait of
exclusion and governance.18 Exclusive control supplies the working
template for property in simple resources; property law then
incorporates various use- and need-based “governance” limitations
when proprietors forfeit their rights to labor or when non-owners
have particularly strong claims to use resources. This Article
illustrates with basic doctrines associated with ownership of land—
trespass, necessity, adverse possession, and various common law and
statutory easements limiting exclusive possession.
This two-tiered rights structure addresses the main problems
from which exclusion and progressive property theories suffer. This
Article’s second claim takes up the contrast between productive labor
theory and progressive property: the former anticipates and avoids
the downsides already noted in the latter. Like progressive property
theories, productive labor theory grounds property in moral interests
in flourishing. As admirable as flourishing is in theory, however, it
provides a troublesome grounding in practice. When property is

this possibility, see also Carol M. Rose, “Enough and as Good” of What?, 81 NW. U. L.
REV. 417, 423–33 (1987).
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Section I.C.
17. See infra Parts II–IV.
18. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S453–55 (2002).
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linked to flourishing, that linkage makes it easy to weaken property
theoretically, by reducing it to a right to use one’s property in the
manner that public authorities decree will help everyone flourish.
That theoretical possibility provides a powerful temptation in
practice, because special interests and idealistic partisans may be
interested in asserting public control over the use of property.
Although these dangers cannot totally be avoided in legal practice,
productive labor theory anticipates and avoids them more effectively
than progressive theories do. To illustrate this claim, this Article
discusses European statutory easements of passage or “rights to
roam”; historic preservation or “landmarking” laws associated with
the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark regulatory takings case, Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York;19 and controversies
over eminent domain and redevelopment, associated most recently
with the Court’s landmark decision in Kelo v. City of New London.20
This Article’s third claim contrasts productive labor theory with
exclusion theories. Productive labor theory anticipates the
philosophical criticisms from which exclusion theories suffer and
supplies answers to them. Exclusive property is philosophically
defensible if, and to the extent that, it helps citizens satisfy their
labor-based moral rights more effectively than simpler systems. In
practice, exclusive property satisfies these expectations if it affords
more people security to use their own resources than an open-access
system would, if it encourages citizens to produce more useful goods,
and if these goods circulate widely through commerce. Not only does
that justification make exclusive property more defensible, but it also
helps clarify the place of economic analysis of property. Exclusive
property can be efficient—as long as people may clearly bargain and
transact with money and property only within the parameters in
which free, equal, and well-socialized citizens would.
Although this Article focuses considerably on one philosophical
theory of property, I hope it stimulates thinking among all property
scholars who incline toward rights-based theories of property. In
current property scholarship, many scholars assume a specialization—
and the exclusion/progressive property debate illustrates it perfectly.
Moral or rights-based theories make strong claims about rights or
normative interests within narrow parameters and only weak claims
or no claims about policy consequences, it is assumed, while economic
theories make broad claims about consequences and few claims about
19. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
20. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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normative goals. As Joseph Singer has noticed, when rights-based
theories are portrayed in this manner, the portrait makes property
scholars seem “tongue-tied when asked to talk about fairness and
justice” and needing a vocabulary “reviving the notion of practical
reason.”21 Singer is correct, and productive labor theory provides a
counterexample correcting the trends that concern him. To be sure,
scholars may find some of the basic claims or operational details of
productive labor theory less than fully satisfying. If these readers can
look past the details of “labor,” “sufficiency,” “survival,” and
“improvement,” however, even they may find productive labor
theory’s approach to practical reasoning generative as an example of
how a moral theory of rights might facilitate and focus practical
reasoning about law. In that respect, I hope this Article offers
possible lessons not only for progressive theories but also for
Rawlsian property theories,22 traditional natural law theories,23
corrective justice theories,24 and pluralist rights-based theories.25
These same basic insights may even interest readers who find
consequentialist theories of property more satisfying. After all, if a
theory of individual rights can reconcile rights to social consequences,
a welfarist theory should be able to reconcile social consequences to
freedom, equality, and individual opportunity.26
This Article’s argument proceeds as follows. Part I surveys
contemporary property scholarship to recount exclusion theories,
progressive theories, and the strengths and limitations of each. Parts
II through V explicate this Article’s first claim, that productive labor
theory justifies property understood as a presumptive right of
21. Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899,
905–06 (2009).
22. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 272–74 (1971) (advocating for the
development of a “property-owning democracy” that conforms with his two principles of
“equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity”).
23. See generally ADAM J. MACLEOD, PROPERTY AND PRACTICAL REASON (2015)
(arguing that the common law institutions and norms of private property ownership are
morally justified based on equal respect for humans as practically reasonable agents).
24. See generally PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY
(2014) (proposing a theory of property based on social recognition, which imposes implicit
constraints on the owner’s decision-making authority); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE
JUSTICE (Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 2012) (applying a theory of corrective justice to
various areas of private law).
25. See generally HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011)
(arguing for a property theory that reflects pluralistic liberal values); J.W. HARRIS,
PROPERTY AND JUSTICE (1996) (advocating a theory of property reflecting the complex
elements which comprise property as an institution).
26. See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the
Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1673 (2003).
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exclusive control and possession capable of being overridden. Part II
starts with flourishing and shows how a moral right to labor follows
from flourishing, and Part III shows how property follows from
flourishing-based labor. Part IV shows how productive labor justifies
property in the form of a right of exclusive control, while Part V
highlights important fairness- or “governance-” based limitations
productive labor establishes on exclusive control.
Parts VI and VII demonstrate, respectively, the Article’s second
and third claims; they show how productive labor theory anticipates
the problems associated with progressive and exclusion theories. Part
VI elaborates on some of the downsides with open-ended conceptions
of “flourishing.” It shows how these downsides may be contained: by
recognizing in citizens moral rights to choose their own paths to
flourishing, and by vesting in owners broadly exclusive rights of
control. Part VII shows how productive labor theory confirms and
broadens progressive criticisms of exclusion theories. Yet productive
labor theory can shore up the normative foundations beneath
economic analysis of property, by clarifying the moral parameters
within which economic analysis is defensible.
I. EXCLUSION AND PROGRESSIVE VALUES IN CONTEMPORARY
PROPERTY THEORY
Since Locke himself acknowledged that people appreciate what
is “familiar and more particular” than what is remote and more
theoretical,27 this Part begins by tracing how contemporary property
scholarship is backing into Lockean themes.
A. The Uneasy Place of Exclusion in Property
As the Introduction explained, property rights seem to leave a
logical gap between justifications and their operating structures.28 The
tort of trespass to land illustrates that gap better than any other
property doctrine. The prima facie action for trespass grants an owner
a cause of action whenever someone else enters her land without her

27. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. I, ch. ii,
§ 14, at 54 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1975) (4th ed. 1700).
28. For examples of how property law tolerates significant gaps between moral
justifications and the legal rules institutionalizing and implementing them, see generally
Adam MacLeod, Bridging the Gaps in Property Theory, 77 MODERN L. REV. 1009 (2014);
Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009).
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consent.29 The entrant need not cause any actual harm to the land; the
harm arises from the entrance itself.30 An action accrues even if the
entrant enters in the mistaken belief that he has a right to go on the
land he enters.31 If property rights are supposed to encourage
investment by guaranteeing owners that they will reap where they
sow, then why are owners entitled to property rights when they have
not improved their lots?
This basic tension runs throughout property law. Consider
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.32 Steenberg Homes employees
cleared a snow path across a field on the Jacques’ 170-acre lot, over
the Jacques’ objections, in order to deliver a mobile home to a
customer because the nearest road was covered in snow.33 Although
the Steenberg Homes assistant manager who ordered the delivery
treated the Jacques contemptuously,34 the employees who towed the
home did not leave any damage on the Jacques’ property.35 The
Jacques refused to approve a crossing in part because they mistakenly
believed that they would have exposed themselves to adverse
possession liability by licensing a crossing and in part simply because
“it was not a question of money . . . [they] just did not want Steenberg
to cross their land.”36
Jacque illustrates both sides of property’s justificatory gap. On
one hand, the case confirms that property rights entitle owners to

29. Heller v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 265 F. 192, 194 (2d Cir. 1920) (“Every
unauthorized entry on another’s property is a trespass and any person who makes such an
entry is a trespasser.”); Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371, 372 (1835) (“[E]very
unauthorised, and therefore unlawful entry . . . is a trespass.”). Further, property includes
intrusions into the subsurface and (within limits set for overflights) the airspace above the
lot. Del Monte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling Co., 171 U.S. 55, 60
(1898) (“The general rule of the common law was that whoever had the fee of the soil
owned all below the surface . . . .”); see also Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 759
(9th Cir. 1936) (limiting a landowner’s right to sue in trespass against an overflight without
“alleging a case of actual and substantial damage”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 158 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Trespass protects not only “owners” but also all
legitimate “possessors.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, at § 158.
30. See Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 267 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan. 1954); WILLIAM L.
PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 70–71 (5th ed.
1984).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 29, § 164
32. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
33. See id. at 156–57 ¶¶ 1–9.
34. See id. at 157 ¶¶ 7–8 (reporting that employees testified at trial that the assistant
manager didn’t “give a — what [Mr. Jacque] said,” ordered the crossing anyway, and then
giggled after he got notification that the mobile home had been towed across their lot
(alteration in original)).
35. See id. at 158–59 ¶¶ 14, 20.
36. Id. at 157 ¶ 6.
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broad protection, of the sort associated with a right to exclude. The
jury found that Steenberg Homes had committed a trespass, awarded
the Jacques $1 in nominal damages, and awarded them another
$100,000 in punitive damages.37 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld both the trespass judgment and the award of punitive
damages. The Jacques did not need to prove actual harm to deserve
punitive damages, the court reasoned, because in cases of intentional
trespass “the actual harm is not in the damage done to the land . . . but
in the loss of the individual’s right to exclude others from his or her
property.”38
However, the court’s justification for this holding was less than
satisfying. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court insisted that “the
private landowner’s right to exclude others from his or her land is
‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property,’ ”39 that and other statements to
the same effect seem not arguments but conclusory assertions. At one
point, the court argued that property protects the right to exclude in
order to protect owner privacy.40 Yet the court did not explain why
the Jacques’ interest in privacy warranted excluding Steenberg
Homes from all of their 160 acres. The court argued that a cause of
action was necessary to prevent the Jacques from suffering annoyance
from intentional trespasses, and to reinforce social expectations that
“wrongdoers who trespass upon [owners’] land will be appropriately
punished.”41 Yet those arguments begged the relevant questions: Why
should intentional entries be deemed trespasses when they are
harmless? And even if entries create some annoyance, should nonowners not have opportunities to excuse their entries—as Steenberg
Homes tried to do when it argued that the road it wanted to use was
blocked by snow?
B.

Early Law and Economic Analyses of Property

Although this justificatory gap exists in Jacque and other
practical materials, it is even more pronounced in scholarship.
Important here, early law and economic analyses called the right to
exclude model of property into significant doubt. That scholarship
will be referred to here as “early” or “post-Coasean transaction-cost
37. Id. at 156 ¶¶ 10.
38. Id. at 159 ¶ 19.
39. Id. at 159–60 ¶ 21 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994)).
40. See id. at 159 ¶ 17–19 (discussing Merest v. Harvey (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 761
(C.P. 1814)).
41. Id. at 159–60 ¶ 26.
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analysis.” Such scholarship is “post-Coasean” because it follows and
builds on the analysis of property disputes developed in Ronald
Coase’s 1960 article The Problem of Social Cost.42 Coase’s innovation
was to portray property disputes as incompatible use disputes, in
which parties rationally bargain to maximize net joint product.43
Following Coase, Richard Posner, Guido Calabresi, and many other
law and economics scholars concluded that the best way to study
property is to inquire which pairings of uses would maximize joint
product in an ideal world, identify transaction costs, and then assign
legal entitlements in the manner that seems most likely to maximize
net joint product after discounting for transaction costs.44
For better or worse, that framework makes property’s exclusive
structure seem even stranger. Take Jacque again. It seems extremely
formalistic to give the Jacques a legal right to exclude Steenberg
Homes without any showing of cause or harm. Any decision that
allows Steenberg Homes to cross the Jacques’ field without liability
seems to avoid two obvious welfare losses: inconveniences to
Steenberg Homes’s customer, and any contractual penalties
Steenberg Homes would have incurred by delivering the mobile home
late. Moreover, the Jacques were not using the plowed field in any
active sense and Steenberg Homes did not actually damage the field.
The Jacques also seemed to be excluding Steenberg Homes for
irrational reasons, especially their mistaken belief that a crossing
license might ripen into an adverse possession claim.45 From this
economic perspective, it might seem sensible to require the Jacques to
prove harm before receiving any relief beyond their nominal dollar,
42. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–4, 8–16 (1960);
see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 155–70 (1996);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1, at 10 (8th ed. 2011); Merrill &
Smith, supra note 4, at 375–83.
43. Coase, supra note 42, at 2–4, 8–16.
44. See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 16–22 (2008);
POSNER, supra note 42, § 3.6–.7, at 67–71; Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as
Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 713–15 (1996);
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1017–20 (2008); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089, 1090–93 (1972); Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of
Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1985); Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource
Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1473–75 (2013); Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control
of Strategic Behavior: Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15, 16–19
(1988); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of
Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1076–80 (1980).
45. See Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 157 ¶ 3.
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and in the process tacitly recognize that Steenberg Homes could
exercise a license good for one crossing only. Or, one might follow
Calabresi and Melamed’s “cathedral” approach and concede that the
Jacques did suffer a trespass, but then limit their remedy to a liability
rule, like a fee approximating the reasonable value of a crossing
license.46
C.

Exclusion Theories

Post-Coasean transaction cost analysis helps property theory by
reminding scholars to consider and contrast the possible
consequences of different assignments of property rights.
Nevertheless, indirectly, such analysis may abstract from the
constraints that make property exclusive. In its simplest forms, postCoasean analysis focuses on use conflicts between two neighbors,47
and it assumes that the parties and all onlookers can agree on the
values and property damage generated by affected activities. Yet
property rights involve not just neighbors but also a wide range of
strangers. Parties may disagree sharply about how valuable a
property’s uses are, and outsiders and public officials may know far
less than the parties about how and why parties value these uses.
These and other complicating factors justify keeping property rights
simple and exception-free—not subject to context-specific balancing,
as early transaction cost analyses tended to suggest.48 Concerns like
these led Robert Ellickson to observe that dogs “are superb boundary
defenders . . . [but] quite useless in enforcing a group’s internal rules
of conduct.”49 Gradually, some law and economics scholars came to
worry that earlier law and economic analyses of property had been
applying “graduate studies” methods to “elementary school”
problems,50 or that earlier scholarship had neglected “the problem of
order” to focus too much on “the refined problems of concern in
advanced economies.”51
Exclusion theories elaborate on these concerns. Although
exclusion theories do not insist that exclusion is logically necessary in
property,52 they do maintain that a right of exclusive control is

46. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 44, at 1106–10.
47. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 370–71, 375.
48. See supra Section I.B.
49. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 1329.
50. Epstein, supra note 4, at 2096.
51. Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 398.
52. See Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist
Conceptions of Private Property, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 223, 229–30 (2011).
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practically necessary, a presumptive starting strategy that should be
overridden only for good cause.53 For example, following Ellickson’s
suggestions about dogs and boundaries, Thomas Merrill and Henry
Smith defended exclusive property as “a device that must coordinate
the actions of a large and anonymous group of people.”54 Although
Merrill and Smith acknowledge that the exclusive model may be
overridden, they stress that exclusion makes sense only as a starting
strategy.55 Merrill and Smith read Jacque as a case confirming their
view; in their opinion, Steenberg Homes was culpable because its
agents deliberately flouted a design model for property that “must be
simple and accessible to all members of the community.”56
Similarly, in a defense of injunctive relief in property, Richard
Epstein argued that such relief protects owner subjective value more
often than other, weaker remedies.57 That argument also helps justify
the result in Jacque. After all, the Jacques seem to have placed a high
subjective premium on being left alone, or on avoiding haggling with
neighbors or companies who might exploit them.58 Of course, Jacque
also tests the limits of the presumption Epstein is willing to make in
favor of subjective value. Epstein acknowledges that the preference
for injunctive relief should be overridden for “momentary crises
(private necessity) or . . . large-scale social arrangements (common
carriers),”59 and one could reasonably argue that the winter blizzard
that precipitated Jacque counted as one of the “momentary crises”
justifying liability rules.60 Even so, Epstein’s account explains why, if
an exception were going to be made for Steenberg Homes, it would
be made from a more general strategy giving the Jacques exclusive
control.

53. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 2106 n.38 (stressing the importance of a
proprietor’s right to “hold” property).
54. Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 394–95.
55. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2063
(2012); Smith, supra note 18, at S453–55.
56. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1849, 1850, 1871–74 (2007).
57. Epstein, supra note 4, at 2092–102.
58. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 157 ¶ 3–6 (Wis. 1997).
59. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 2092–93, 2120.
60. See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908) (“A traveler on a highway
who finds it obstructed from a sudden and temporary cause may pass upon the adjoining
land without becoming a trespasser because of the necessity.”); Epstein, supra note 4, at
2108 n.47, 2109–10 (citing Ploof, 71 A. at 189).
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D. Progressive Theories
Although exclusion theories have helped explain the exclusion in
property, they have not addressed the justificatory gap completely.
Like all other economic analyses of legal rules, exclusion theories
assume that economic analysis can supply adequate normative
justifications for legal rules. This assumption was challenged
vigorously in the 1970s and 1980s, as economic analysis became
prominent throughout American legal scholarship.61 From the fact
that a given rule is efficient, non-economists argued, it does not follow
that the rule is philosophically legitimate, to the point that it could be
enforced under threat of coercion and penalty.62 Progressive theories
of property have renewed these concerns about economic analysis.
Although “[p]rogressive property is more an orientation than a
fully defined set of values or intellectual commitments,”63 one of its
constitutive features is concern about the normative pretensions of
economic analysis. In 2009, Gregory Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver,
Joseph Singer, and Laura Underkuffler jointly signed A Statement of
Progressive Property.64 The co-signers warned against making
property law “solely a matter of satisfying personal preferences,” and
warned that reducing the normative values property serves “to one
common currency distorts their intrinsic worth.”65 In their individual
works, Singer has marked off what he calls “severe limitations” in
efficiency analysis,66 Alexander has warned that law and economic
analysis suffers from “poverty of its analysis of moral values and
moral issues[,]”67 and Peñalver devoted half of a recent article to
critiquing normative justifications for wealth maximization in
property.68

61. See infra Part VII.
62. See infra Part VII.A.
63. Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property,
101 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 115 (2013). The rest of this Section relies considerably on
previous summaries by Rosser, id. at 115–27, and John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in
Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act of 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 743–46 (2011).
64. Alexander et al., supra note 6.
65. Id. at 743–44.
66. Singer, supra note 21, at 904, 915–21.
67. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 750 (2009).
68. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 832–60 (2009).
Progressive works tend not to distinguish between post-Coasean transaction cost analyses
and exclusion theories in this regard; they suggest that works in both groups leave
unaddressed hard questions about the relationship between economic analysis and legal
legitimacy. See, e.g., id. at 823–24 & n.6 (criticizing five different law and economic
scholarly works for their “over-reliance on land’s market value . . . in crafting their positive
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Works in the progressive property movement have offered
alternative justifications for property, and two recurring features
loom large in these justifications. First, progressive justifications
ground property in normative interests in flourishing, specifically in
pluralistic understandings of flourishing. Here, the progressive
movement echoes in American legal theory themes prominent in law
and property scholarship in Europe and the developing world.69 In
continental European law, property has been understood to have a
social function, which “evokes a plurality of values: equitable
distribution of resources, participatory management of resources, and
productive efficiency,” and leads to specific balances of different
values for different “resource-specific property regimes.”70 Similarly,
A Statement of Progressive Property grounds property in “plural and
incommensurable values” covering life, security, freedom to live life
on one’s chosen terms, and flourishing.71
Second, because they ground property in pluralistic
understandings of flourishing, progressive property theories also tend
to oppose the Blackstonian right to exclude portrait of property.
Property is often portrayed as a triangular relation between an owner,
a thing, and non-owners.72 Blackstone’s “despotic dominion” image,
and cases like Jacque, stress the side between the owner and the
thing.73 An account of property cannot make primary the thing-owner
side, progressive works argue, without unduly deprecating the other
two metaphorical sides.74 Hence, A Statement of Progressive Property
models of landowner behavior” and stressing the “limited normative significance of
economists’ positive findings”).
69. Lovett, supra note 63, at 776 n.203; Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of
Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 872 (2013).
70. Di Robilant, supra note 69, at 872; see Sheila R. Foster & Daniel Bonilla, The
Social Function of Property: A Comparative Perspective, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003,
1004–08 (2011).
71. Alexander et al., supra note 6, at 743; see Alexander, supra note 67, at 751
(“[H]uman flourishing is a multivariable concept and . . . the multiple relevant components
of human flourishing are incommensurable.”); Peñalver, supra note 68, at 867 (praising
virtue ethics for its “recognition of a plurality of values”); Singer, supra note 21, at 944
(“[W]e have plural, incommensurable values and . . . we generally hold to a form of
practical reason to decide hard cases in a pragmatic manner.”).
72. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12
(1928) (“Whatever technical definition of property we may prefer, we must recognize that
a property right is a relation not between an owner and a thing, but between the owner
and other individuals in reference to things.”).
73. See infra Section I.A.
74. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF
PROPERTY 131 (2000) (“Individuals achieve autonomy not by complete separation from
others but by a combination of independence and dependence . . . [or]
interdependence . . . .”).

95 N.C. L. REV. 413 (2017)

2017]

LABOR, EXCLUSION, AND FLOURISHING

429

warns that the right to exclude is “inadequate as the sole basis for
resolving property conflicts or for designing property institutions.”75
In the same spirit, Eric Freyfogle criticizes conceptions of ownership
whereby “landowners possess inherent rights to use their lands
intentionally, free of restraint, so long as they avoid visibly harming
anyone else.”76
As with earlier transaction cost and exclusion theories, the
moniker “progressive” does not determine all of the details needed to
settle a difficult case such as Jacque. Even so, because progressive
theories relate property to flourishing and pluralistic values, they
have a tendency to encourage legal officials to intervene closely in
property disputes. Assume that a plaintiff insists that exclusion from
her lot protects one cherished value and that a defendant insists that
access to the plaintiff-owner’s lot will facilitate a different and
incommensurable cherished value. That conflict seems to force the
court to decide which party’s interest is more valuable to the
community at large. Thus, when Alexander defends the result in
Jacque, he does not do so by justifying exclusion as a general strategy,
but instead by asking whether the Jacques’ interest in home residence
or Steenberg Homes’ commercial interests contribute more to
flourishing.77 Even though Freyfogle disagrees with Alexander about
Jacque’s outcome, he portrays the stakes in a similar manner:
“[E]xactly why did the Jacques . . . possess a legal right to be so
uncooperative? No question of privacy was involved, Steenberg
Homes was not knocking down crops or otherwise interfering with a
land use, and it offered to pay rent.”78
E.

Lockean Theory

In short, exclusion theories can explain the function that
exclusion serves in property, but they leave doubts about the
legitimacy of economic analysis. Progressive property theorists are
right to raise those doubts, and they put property on more solid
foundations by connecting property to human flourishing. However,
progressive property works do not give a satisfactory account of why
exclusion might play a role in property law.
75. Alexander et al., supra note 6, at 743.
76. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON GOOD 2 (2003).
77. See Alexander, supra note 67, at 816–17.
78. Eric T. Freyfogle, The Enclosure of America 53–54 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Papers Series, Paper No. 07–10, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024846
[https://perma.cc/F5LU-52GP].
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When faced with an impasse like this, it may be time to step
outside the confines of current debates and search for a different
perspective. Here, readers should wonder whether any theories of
property manage to justify exclusion while reconciling it to
flourishing.
This is why this Article takes a longer look at the teachings of
John Locke. Many classical liberal justifications for rights take
property and flourishing seriously. For example, following the U.S.
Declaration of Independence,79 the North Carolina Constitution
declares that it is “self-evident that all persons . . . are endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable rights,” including both “the
enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of
happiness.”80 Even so, Locke provides a lengthier defense of property
than Blackstone and other classical liberal theorists and jurists, he is
well known and respected among contemporary scholars, and his
justification for property may reasonably be linked to human
flourishing.
This last suggestion may sound surprising. Scholars on all sides
assume that classical liberal theories of rights can justify the right to
exclude—but cannot link property to flourishing. Classical liberal or
natural rights theories are assumed to focus on negative rights,
autonomy-based rights, or “will”81 theories of rights.82 Robert
Nozick’s libertarian book Anarchy, State, and Utopia83 is often
portrayed in property scholarship as the definitive justification for
classical liberal theories of rights.84 In progressive property works, it is
often assumed that classical liberal theories “provide[] a strikingly
thin understanding of the social obligations of private ownership”—at
which point they cite Nozick.85 Yet these impressions simply confirm
79. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
80. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1.
81. On the differences between will- and interest-based theories of rights, see, for
example, Leif Wenar, Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed.,
2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/ [https://perma.cc/RWN4XCNT].
82. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1851–52 (1987) (contrasting “traditional liberal” rights to life, liberty, and property with a
theory of “human flourishing”); see also id. at 1897–903 (portraying traditional liberalism
as being preoccupied with negative liberty and portraying Mill’s and Kant’s political
theories as exemplary); Singer, supra note 21, at 922 (assuming that “classical liberalism”
means “separation of the right and the good”).
83. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
84. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 74, at 168; see also Merrill, supra note 10, at 497–98
(comparing Locke’s theory of property with Nozick’s).
85. Alexander, supra note 67, at 753 n.17; see, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, The Utopian
Promise of Private Law, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 392, 393 (2016) (singling out and criticizing
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how helpful it would be to take a closer and longer look at Locke. As
the Declaration of Independence and the North Carolina
Constitution both suggest, many classical liberal actors valued
flourishing. Although modern scholars anachronistically read these
works to propound primarily-negative theories of rights, classical
liberal jurists and theorists actually propounded affirmative, interestbased theories of rights, where the “interests” in question were moral
interests in rational flourishing.86 Philosophical work over the last
generation has revealed that linkage, especially in relation to
property.87 That work is getting noticed in the legal academy, as
witnessed by Alexander and Peñalver’s observation that Locke’s
theory differs substantially from the libertarian “position . . . typically
ascribed to him within contemporary property scholarship.”88
If Lockean labor theory can be understood in a manner that
connects exclusive property rights to flourishing, that understanding
may provide a robust alternative to property theories prevalent today.
On one hand, if Lockean labor theory is grounded in flourishing,89 it
can help progressive scholars by clarifying the case for exclusive
property and reconciling such property to the values exclusion
sometimes impedes. On the other hand, if a flourishing-based account
of property can justify exclusion, it may offer a foundation for
Nozick’s entitlement theory as the prime candidate for justifying robust theories of
property); Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 448 (2014) (treating
Locke’s labor theory as closely resembling Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory and other
libertarian theories).
86. See, e.g., BUCKLE, supra note 13, at 149–90; PETER C. MYERS, OUR ONLY STAR
AND COMPASS: LOCKE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL RATIONALITY 190–96
(1998); A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 68–120 (1992); GOPAL
SREENIVASAN, THE LIMITS OF LOCKEAN RIGHTS IN PROPERTY 135–37 (1995);
MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, LAUNCHING LIBERALISM: ON LOCKEAN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 220–24 (2002); Thomas G. West, The Ground of Locke’s Law of Nature, 29
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2012).
87. See, e.g., BUCKLE, supra note 13, at 149–90; MYERS, supra note 86, at 190–96;
SIMMONS, supra note 86, at 135–37; ZUCKERT, supra note 86, at 220–24; West, supra note
86, at 1–2.
88. ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 14, at 56; see also Adam Mossoff, Saving
Locke from Marx: The Labor Theory of Value in Intellectual Property Theory, 29 SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y 283, 284 (2012) (arguing, as a matter of hermeneutics and intellectual
history, that Locke’s theory of labor “refers to production, which has intellectual as well as
physical characteristics, and his concept of value serves his moral ideal of human
flourishing”).
89. Or, in the alternative, Lockean political and property theory can be reconstructed
so as to be compatible with flourishing-based foundations. I am persuaded that Locke was
a eudaemonist or a flourishing-based theorist. In case I am wrong as a matter of
hermeneutics and intellectual history, however, I have structured the presentation of
productive labor theory that follows so that the theory rests on flourishing-based
foundations anyway.
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property rights currently lacking in economically-based exclusion
theories. To explore this possibility, the next four Parts of this Article
connect labor to flourishing and exclusive property rights. The next
Part starts with the linkages between flourishing and labor.
II. PRODUCTIVE LABOR
A. Flourishing
It is perfectly understandable why Locke has been portrayed as a
libertarian and not a flourishing-based natural lawyer. As Blackstone
is remembered for his “despotic dominion” passage early in Book II
of his Commentaries,90 so Locke is remembered for this claim very
early in his second treatise: “[A]ll Men are naturally in . . . a State of
perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their
Possessions, and Persons, as they think fit within the bounds of the
Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of
any other Man.”91 This passage makes Locke’s program sound like
one of negative liberty and autonomy-based rights, and Nozick cites
this passage as a point of departure.92
Even so, Locke does rely on a flourishing-based approach to
morality. The phrase “within the bounds of the Law of Nature” limits
the freedom Locke describes within the bounds of the natural law.93
Although this passage may not seem significant to libertarians, it
limits and focuses the freedom Locke justifies—as Locke shows when
he criticizes suicide.94 More relevant to property, although people do
not need to take “leave” from neighbors to enjoy their rights, their
rights need to be structured with due and sociable respect for the
rights of others. Deeper in the recesses of the Two Treatises, Locke
also intimates that “Law, in its true Notion, is not so much the
Limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper
Interest,” and is always implicitly measured by whether its subjects
“[c]ould . . . be happier without it.”95 And in his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, which “establish[es] secure rational

90. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *2.
91. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.4, at 269.
92. See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 83, at 10.
93. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.4, at 269.
94. See id. §§ II.6, II.135, at 271, 357 (stating that no one should destroy “himself” or
“his own Life”); see also George Windstrup, Locke on Suicide, 8 POL. THEORY 169, 175
(1980).
95. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.57, at 305.
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foundations for morality” assumed in the Two Treatises,96 Locke
suggests that “Morality is the proper Science, and Business of
Mankind in general; (who are both concerned, and fitted to search out
their Summum Bonum).”97
These passages reflect the main hallmarks of a flourishing-based
morality. Summum bonum refers to a highest or complete good, i.e.
the happiness of a mature and rational actor.98 In contrast with
deontological and consequentialist metaethical groundings, which
ground morality (respectively) in the logical structure of the
obligations that arise from moral agency, or in good consequences,
flourishing-based theories (often called “eudaimonist” theories) make
“primitive” or “morally fundamental”99 a complete, rational, and
objective understanding of happiness.
B.

Rights

Yet if Locke grounds political rights in “happiness,” a summum
bonum, and other concepts associated with flourishing, why do rights
loom so large in his political theory? In short, there are two ideal
strategies for promoting flourishing. In one, the government or
community leaders determine which conditions will help each person
flourish, and they design laws and government policies to pursue
those conditions. In the other, the government declares and protects
individual rights in the hope and expectation that people will use their
rights to pursue forms of flourishing they find particularly gratifying.
Although Locke relies on the former strategy to a limited degree, he
relies considerably more on the latter.100 He also makes the latter
strategy central in his arguments and imagery.101

96. See JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY 94 (2002).
97. LOCKE, supra note 27, bk. I, ch. xii, § 11, at 646; accord JOHN LOCKE, Some
Thoughts Concerning Education (1963), in SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION
AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 10 (Ruth W. Grant & Nathan
Tarcov eds., 1996) (proposing that children be educated to be content, civil, and useful
toward others, capable of discerning what will make them objectively happy, and capable
of attaining such happiness).
98. See West, supra note 86, at 30–31, 36–37.
99. See Jonathan Wolff, Scanlon on Well-Being, in ON WHAT WE OWE TO EACH
OTHER 32, 33–34 (Philip Stratton-Lake ed., 2004); Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu
/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/ [https://perma.cc/2YFG-XRXQ] (explaining
further the concepts of flourishing-based morality and eudaimonia).
100. See supra Section I.E.
101. See supra Section I.E.
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Although Part VI will recount the reasons for this preference at
greater length,102 one justification should suffice for the time being—
what might be called “epistemological mediocrity.” A natural rights
political program tries to be realistic and sober about what
government can do. In post-Coasean transaction cost scholarship,
scholars optimistically assumed that “[judges] may be able to
approximate the [economically] optimum definition of property
rights.”103 Many political philosophers are not nearly as optimistic. As
Singer recently explained, “Long ago Aristotle argued that we cannot
expect exactitude in the realm of moral reasoning . . . . He began his
Nicomachean Ethics by noting that ‘[o]ur discussion will be adequate
if it has as much clarity as the subject-matter allows . . . .’ ”104
Notwithstanding their differences on many other important matters,
Locke agrees with Aristotle in this respect. Although Locke concedes
that “Knowledge and Certainty” can be attained in math and some
parts of the physical sciences, human affairs are stuck in a “State of
Mediocrity” in which actors can only attain to “Judgment and
Opinion.”105
At the same time, Locke worries far more than Aristotle seemed
to worry about epistemological mediocrity in designing political
theories and institutions. Because people’s knowledge and wisdom
are bounded, classical liberals suspect, government promotes
flourishing best when it acts indirectly.106 Often enough, government
is incompetent at ascertaining what uses and activities best promote
flourishing. Government is least incompetent at securing the lowcommon-denominator elements of flourishing—life, health, security,
and the capacity to enjoy love and friendship in families and simple
associations. Because “these generic goods constitute a natural

102. Part VI does not cover one other factor relevant to Locke’s theory of politics—a
political program of duties has a tendency to make citizens submissive and expectant that
the political sovereign will take care of their problems for them. Buckle, supra note 13, at
149–50 (stressing that “self-preservation enjoys a priority” in the Two Treatises);
SIMMONS, supra note 86, at 95–102 (explaining how Locke’s theory of politics shifts from a
theory centered on duties and obedience to God to one centered on rights and selfreliance in the protection of those rights). A political program of rights encourages citizens
to be spirited and use self-help to take care of their own problems. See SIMMONS, supra
note 86, at 68–86.
103. POSNER, supra note 42, § 3.6, at 67.
104. Singer, supra note 21, at 930–31 (alteration in orginal) (quoting ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I., ch. 3, at 5 (John Warrington ed. & trans., M.M. Dent &
Sons Limited 1963) (350 B.C.E.)).
105. LOCKE, supra note 27, bk. IV, ch. xii, § 10, at 645.
106. LARRY ARNHART, POLITICAL QUESTIONS: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY FROM
PLATO TO PINKER 490 (4th ed. 2016).
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standard for the human good,” government promotes flourishing as
best it can when it “properly enforce[s] the conditions for people to
have the liberty to pursue their summum bonum in the natural and
voluntary associations of civil society.”107 Although Nozick does not
embrace this approach himself, he fairly describes it as a serious
alternative to libertarian thought. Even though “there is a kind of life
that objectively is the best for [each person,] . . . [p]eople are different,
so that there is not one kind of life which objectively is the best for
everyone . . . .”108 In such a regime, a just community should define
basic rights, to life, liberty, property, and basic association, and then
let people seek their own preferred forms of rational flourishing in
the free exercise of their rights.
Before we study intricate details of property law, consider how
this strategy applies in simpler settings, involving relatively basic legal
rules protecting the integrity of the human person. The prima facie
action for battery resembles closely the prima facie action for trespass
to land: an unauthorized touching of the plaintiff’s person is a
battery.109 Although secure control of one’s body does not lead
directly to any one way of life, it is a necessary precondition for all
rational and flourishing lives. Now, if battery were the only doctrine
specifying the extent of bodily liberty, some people might sell
themselves into slavery or engage in prostitution. Yet those activities
are not consistent with rational understandings of human happiness
for their participants, and they also threaten the rights of other
members of the community insofar as the existence of those
institutions encourage others to view their neighbors as potential
tools for their economic projects or sexual gratification.110 Some
supporters of natural rights might argue that mature actors should be
free to enter into consensual slave-master or prostitute-client
relations.111 Yet the differences between those positions reinforce

107. Id.
108. NOZICK, supra note 83, at 310.
109. See, e.g., Wishnatsky v. Huey, 584 N.W.2d 859, 860 (N.D. Ct. App. 1998); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 29, §§ 18–19 (stating that battery results
when there is an unauthorized touching, intended to cause harm, that would offend “a
reasonable sense of personal dignity”).
110. See Julia O’Connell Davidson, The Rights and Wrongs of Prostitution, HYPATIA,
May 2002, at 84, 85–86 (2002) (describing how bargaining for labor—sexual or not—
theoretically requires “seller[s] to temporarily surrender or suspend aspects of [their]
will[s]”).
111. See NOZICK, supra note 83, at 331 (arguing that a free system should allow for
consensual slave-master relationships); CHRIS MATTHEW SCIABARRA, TOTAL FREEDOM:
TOWARD A DIALECTICAL LIBERTARIANISM 6 (2000) (explaining that some libertarians
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broader contrasts between libertarian understandings of rights and
classical liberal, flourishing-based alternatives. Even though both
approaches value rights highly, in the latter approach rights need to
be justified by the extent to which they facilitate rational flourishing
within a common moral and social order supporting everyone’s
efforts to flourish. The classical liberal approach marks off a few
outer-limit prohibitions on what people may do with their bodies.112 It
entrusts authorities with responsibility to institute and enforce public
morals restrictions supporting those prohibitions.113 Otherwise, it bets
that most people have enough self-interest and motivation to use
broad freedom to pursue rationally defensible forms of human
flourishing.
C.

Labor

This background gives “labor” its justification and focus. Since
labor is justified in relation to flourishing, labor constitutes intelligent,
purposeful activity contributing to rational flourishing in some
respect. Yet a rights-based regime focuses on life, security, and other
low and solid preconditions for flourishing. People may bracket their
disagreements about the best ways of life, and agree to respect one
another’s rights to engage in activities contributing to “the
114
Subsistence and Comfort of [an actor’s] Life,”
or “the best
advantage of Life, and convenience.”115
In that context, “labor” comes to mean the right to engage in
activity pursuing survival or legitimate forms of thriving. That is why
Australian philosopher Stephen Buckle defines “labor” as “rational
(or purposeful), value-creating activity . . . directed toward the
preservation or comfort of our being.”116 Similarly, American
philosopher John Simmons defines it as “free, intentional, purposive
action aimed at satisfying needs or supplying the conveniences of
life.”117
So construed, a right to labor stands in a middle ground between
autonomy-based libertarian theories on one side and progressive
property theories on the other. On one hand, a labor-based approach
strongly defend people’s rights to engage in any social activities and relationships,
including prostitution).
112. LOCKE, supra note 8, §§ II.6, II.135, at 271, 357.
113. See Eric R. Claeys, The Private Society and the Liberal Public Good in John
Locke’s Thought, 25 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 201, 223–24 (2008).
114. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.92, at 209.
115. Id. § II.26, at 286.
116. BUCKLE, supra note 13, at 151.
117. A. John Simmons, Makers’ Rights, 2 J. ETHICS 197, 210 (1998).

95 N.C. L. REV. 413 (2017)

2017]

LABOR, EXCLUSION, AND FLOURISHING

437

imposes responsibilities on property use and ownership not implied in
libertarian theories. As a flourishing-based right to life bars suicide,
so a flourishing-based right to labor entails a responsibility to use
property productively.118 That responsibility automatically rules out
“acts of destruction or mere amusement.”119 Nozick famously asked
whether someone can appropriate a sea by pouring Carbon-14
120
radioactive tomato juice in it, and Jeremy Waldron asked whether
someone could appropriate a vat of cement by placing a ham
sandwich in it before the cement hardened.121 These hypotheticals test
several features of labor, including whether the concept covers
activity that exerts positive effort of no or negative moral value. It
does not. In neither hypothetical does the actor contribute to
anyone’s well-being; the juice and sandwich are instead made useless
to human survival or improvement.122
On the other hand, once it is shown that someone engages in
some non-trivial and rational labor, productive labor theory takes a
tack sharply different from progressive property theories. As
Section I.D explained, those theories often resolve such choices by
comparing or balancing the disputants’ use claims. Because
productive labor theory is part of a theory of rights, it defers such
comparisons as long as is practically feasible. If one party has priority
in relation to a resource and deploys it to some non-trivial, beneficial
life use, that dedicated use should not be balanced against the needs
or wishes of others without a clear justification. Jacque provides an
excellent illustration as well. The road-blocking blizzard might create
a situation in which interest balancing might be unavoidable.123
Ordinarily, however, it is preferable to give parties clear authority
over their own resources and to warn them to refrain from disrupting
others’ management of their own resources. Because the Jacques held
title to their lot,124 their use plans deserved presumptive priority and
respect.

118. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
119. BUCKLE, supra note 13, at 151.
120. See NOZICK, supra note 83, at 175.
121. See Jeremy Waldron, Two Worries About Mixing One’s Labour, 33 PHIL. Q. 37,
43 (1983).
122. See BUCKLE, supra note 13, at 152–53; see also Claeys, supra note 14, at 23–24;
Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 159–60 (2002).
123. See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text; infra Section IV.D.2 (explaining
further the character of exclusive property and property rights).
124. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc, 563 N.W. 2d 154, 156 ¶ 2 (Wis. 1997)
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III. PRODUCTIVE LABOR AND PROPERTY
A. The Social Dimensions of Property
In the portrait just given of Jacque, the decisive factor is that the
Jacques already owned their lot. By giving conventional property
rights great weight, that portrait may reinforce the impression that so
concerns progressive property scholars: that property consists of a
normative relation in which an “owner has a right to exclude others
and owes no further obligation to them.”125 Productive labor theory
does not create such a normative relation. To explain why, however,
we must consider how labor rights justify property.
A Statement of Progressive Property claims that property rights
must “look to the underlying human values that property serves and
the social relationships it shapes and reflects.”126 But progressive
property theories are not the only ones to justify property rights as
social relations,127 and productive labor theory has its own distinct
account of those relations. One can see as much from the problem
Locke takes as his point of departure: “[H]ow Labour could at first
begin a title of Property in the common things of Nature . . . .”128 In a
community without organized government, all resources are open for
use by all. This presumption for open access represents not only a
“mere starting place” but also “a concrete expression of the equal
standing of, and the community relationship between, all people.”129
To appropriate a usable thing and exclude others from accessing it, a
prospective appropriator must show that private property respects the
claims of all the people interested in that resource better than open
access does.
Productive labor theory makes four different considerations
relevant to that showing. Two considerations are prerequisites that a
prospective appropriator must demonstrate to justify appropriation:
productive use and claim-marking, discussed in Section III.B and
Section III.C below, respectively. The other two considerations are
overrides, considerations that non-proprietors may invoke to limit

125. Alexander, supra note 67, at 747.
126. Alexander et al., supra note 6, at 743.
127. See, e.g., MACLEOD, supra note 23, at 173–215 (justifying correlative property
rights on the basis of perfectionist political theory).
128. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.51, at 302 (emphases removed and added).
129. Seana Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 138, 167 (Stephen R.
Munzer ed., 2001).
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claims to resources already appropriated. These overrides, sufficiency
and necessity, are discussed in Section III.D below.
B.

Productive Use

The first prerequisite—productive use—should be easy to
appreciate. If a person discovers and starts using a resource in a
manner that improves that person’s well being, he has engaged in
commendable conduct. His effective “expansion of the available
social resources” entitles him to continue his use, manage the
resource, and enjoy the benefits that follow from it.130 Because labor
and property are both justified in a rights-based framework, the
productive use requirement is relatively easy to satisfy. In Western
prior appropriation law, it is only the occasional extreme case, like
using water to flood gopher holes, where an actual use of water fails
to count as a “beneficial use” establishing an appropriative right.131
With productive labor, if a resource contributes to any intelligible
degree to someone’s survival or improvement, that contribution
satisfies productive use.
Yet productive use also limits property rights. As nonuse can
lead to the abandonment or forfeiture of an usufructuary right in
appropriation doctrine, nonuse also causes a property right to expire
in a labor-based morality.132 A laborer acquires only as much property
“as any one can make use of [the resource] to any advantage of life
before it spoils. . . . whatever is beyond this, is more than [the
proprietor’s] share”133 and remains open to others’ discovery and
beneficial use.
So structured, the productive use requirement anticipates and
encompasses many social obligations or limitations on property rights
recently discussed elsewhere. Some portraits of Lockean labor theory
include a waste proviso; spoliation is one of many ways in which a
proprietor may violate the productive use requirement.134 Recent
works have stressed several social duties for owners: to maintain their

130. See BUCKLE, supra note 13, at 154.
131. See Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972,
1007 (Cal. 1935) (gopher holes); see also Reed D. Benson, Alive but Irrelevant: The Prior
Appropriation Doctrine in Today’s Western Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 675, 676–77
(2012) (providing a general background to “beneficial use” and appropriative rights).
132. See, e.g., E. Twin Lakes Ditches & Water Works, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of
Lake Cty., 76 P.3d 918, 921 (Colo. 2003).
133. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.31, at 290.
134. See id. §§ II.38, II.46, at 295, 300 (respectively); SIMMONS, supra note 86, at 285–
88; JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 207–09 (1988).
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property in good condition,135 not to destroy their property
needlessly,136 or to use their property solely or primarily with spite or
malice.137 In productive labor theory, all of these various obligations
are penumbras emanating from a more fundamental imperative of
productive use.
C.

Claim-Marking

The second prerequisite for labor-based property is an element
called here “claim-marking.” When claimants use resources, they
must stake claims to them and maintain those claims in ways that
other members of the same community are reasonably likely to
understand and respect. In law, this standard often generates
requirements for appropriation, clear possession, or diversion.138 To
avoid confusion with any particular legal term, the requirement will
be referred to here as a responsibility of “claim-marking.”
Claim-marking is a major adaption to property’s social character.
Many basic moral rights relating to life and liberty can be fairly
simply: by the private law rules on battery139 or public law
“prohibitions against killing, raping, and maiming.”140 Property rights
and obligations should not be so simple because all individuals in a
community deserve equal opportunities to use resources for their own
life goals. When anyone intends to appropriate a resource, that
person owes fellow community members a duty to make her
appropriation reasonably clear. As Simmons explains, “Labor must
show enough seriousness of purpose to ‘overbalance’ the community
of things. . . . One’s labor need not be completed to ‘begin a
property,’ but it must (to abuse legal language) constitute a real
‘attempt’ and not ‘mere preparation.’ ”141 Property claimants respect
their neighbors when they engage in “real attempts” to appropriate
and use resources; claimants do not respect their neighbors’ equal
135. See generally Shoked, supra note 85 (chronicling various settings in which a “duty
to maintain” has been imposed).
136. See generally Lior Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005)
(discussing the evolution of the right to destroy one’s own property).
137. See generally Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse
of Property Right, 122 YALE L.J. 1444 (2013) (describing limitations on a property right
when the owner’s objective is to cause harm).
138. See generally Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 73 (1985) (analyzing the means by which property becomes “possessed” in classic
American case law).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 109–13.
140. MACLEOD, supra note 23, at 1.
141. SIMMONS, supra note 86, at 272 (quoting LOCKE, supra note 8, §§ II.40, II.51, at
296, 302 (respectively)).
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opportunities to appropriate resources for their own purposes when
they claim resources on the basis of “mere preparation.” In Locke’s
terminology, appropriative effort does not constitute morallydeserving labor unless it “put[s] a distinction between [appropriated
resources] and common.”142
In easy cases, the conduct that establishes productive use
simultaneously marks the relevant claims. The labor that tills land
simultaneously, “as it were, inclose[s] it from the Common.”143 In
hard cases, however, productive use and claim-marking can diverge.
Thus, if a land prospector discovers new land in an airplane survey,
the discovery by itself does not appropriate the land. Even if someone
pours Nozick’s Carbon-14 laced tomato juice into a sea for what
clearly seems a productive use (for example, to feed fish), the pouring
does not stake boundaries clear enough to demarcate what part of the
sea has been appropriated.144 In neither case is the claimant respectful
of others’ equal opportunities to use land or sea water.
D. Provisos: Necessity and Sufficiency
Morally, productive use and clear claim-marking establish a
moral property right. When a claimant acquires property, however,
that property does not entitle the proprietor to exclude others with no
further obligation. Analytically, labor-based moral rights include a
liberty, or Hohfeldian privilege, to use the resource, and a claim-right
to be free from interference while using it.145 But the liberty and
claim-right may both be overridden if and when others in society can
prove that their preservation- or improvement-related needs are
more urgent than the owner’s property. The other two elements of
labor—the necessity and sufficiency provisos—describe these
overrides. Analytically, and from the perspective of the owner, these
provisos describe exposures (Hohfeldian no-rights) to the possibility
that non-owners may use the objects of their property without their

142. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.28, at 288.
143. Id. § II.32, at 291.
144. See NOZICK, supra note 83, at 174–75.
145. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–59 (1913) (proposing an analytical taxonomy of
obligations encompassing claim-rights and duties, no-rights and privileges, powers and
liabilities, and disabilities and immunities). Stephen Munzer suggests that the liberty
comes with a Hohfeldian power to convert what had been an unowned resource into an
owned resource. STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 263–64 (1990). Munzer
focuses on the jural relations before a prospective owner appropriates a resource, id.; this
Article’s text focuses on the relations in effect after appropriation.
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consent, and duties to refrain from interfering with proviso-exercisers’
legitimate activities.
These two provisos operate in morality as limits on riparian
water use do in traditional riparian law. In riparian law, riparians may
divert water, subject to exposures when their neighbors need water
for essential life uses or claim equal opportunities to consume water
for their own wants.146 In productive labor theory, the necessity (or
charity) proviso reflects the limit protecting non-owners with basic
life needs. Even though Lockean natural rights theory is structured to
avoid picking and choosing between different forms of flourishing,147
that preference may be overridden in extreme cases. If a non-owner’s
“pressing Wants . . . where he has no means to subsist otherwise” turn
on access to an owner’s good, the owner may not “justly make use of
another’s necessity.”148
The other proviso is the sufficiency proviso. The same capacities
and interests that entitle any one person to appropriate and labor on
resources entitle others to appropriate similar portions of those
resources for their own life goals.149 Accordingly, a farmer may
acquire property in relation to farmland by fencing and farming it.
But if he appropriates more land initially than was consistent with
others’ appropriating similar areas for their own uses, the excluded
non-owners may cite the sufficiency proviso to force the farmer to
give up land to the point that they have “enough, and as good” as the
farmer.150
IV. PRODUCTIVE LABOR’S JUSTIFICATION FOR EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY
In short, when “labor” is justified in relation to survival and
rational improvement, it yields a social account of property.
Proprietors are linked to non-owners by four correlative moral
obligations: duties to use their property productively, duties to keep
declaring claims to it, exposures to others’ urgent needs, and
exposures to others’ liberties to acquire and use resources sufficient
146. See, e.g., Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. 492, 492 (3 Scam) (1842) (depicting a
dispute between two mill owners operating their businesses at different points on the same
stream during a drought).
147. See supra Section II.B.
148. LOCKE, supra note 8, § I.42, at 170. See generally Steven Forde, The Charitable
John Locke, 71 REV. POL. 428 (2009) (arguing that Locke’s view of property contains, at
its core, a concern for the common welfare).
149. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.33, at 291.
150. Id., §§ II.27, II.33, at 288, 291 (respectively); see also BUCKLE, supra note 13, at
159–60; SIMMONS, supra note 86, at 288–98.
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for their own equal opportunities.151 Those linkages make labor-based
moral property rights usufructs, rights to use and consume resources,
limited by others’ having rights to access, use, and consume them on
similar terms. If moral property rights have this usufructuary
character, however, labor-based property rights seem to have the
same problem as all the other justifications recounted in Part I. Labor
seems incapable of justifying the exclusive and trespassory character
of property rights. As Eric Freyfogle has asked, should we not expect
usufructuary moral rights to justify “private owners holding
something akin to use rights, tailored to respect the common
good”?152 Part IV and Part V take up these questions. This Part
explains how labor justifies exclusive legal rights, and the next Part
shows how the sufficiency proviso institutes important limitations on
those rights.
A. Practical Reasoning About Substantive Property Rights
When scholars wonder whether property rights should limit
“private owners [to] something akin to use rights,” they make a
demanding expectation on a moral theory of rights. If legal rules do
not track closely the elements of the justifying theory, the expectation
holds, they violate the theory’s principles.153 Although this
expectation is understandable, it seems unrealistic and uncharitable in
many settings. Many moral theories, and especially flourishing-based
theories, tolerate a considerable amount of slippage between moral
foundations and practical reasoning.154
The expectation mistakenly suggests that productive labor theory
is supposed to supply a specific template for law and politics. Not so.
Productive labor theory provides general standards by which specific
laws and practices may be judged legitimate or unsatisfactory. Moral
philosophers commonly use speed limits and side-of-the-road driving
restrictions to illustrate the relation between moral rights and legal
rules.155 Conventional property rights and regulations relate to labor
as traffic rules relate to personal interests in safety and liberty to
travel. The elements of productive labor supply a “great Foundation”
for property rights,156 which is to say they lay down fundamental goals
151. See supra Part III.
152. FREYFOGLE, supra note 76, at 239.
153. See Smith, supra note 28, at 963–71 (critiquing this tendency in Alexander, supra
note 67).
154. See text accompanying supra notes 105–06.
155. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 285–86 (2d ed. 2011).
156. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.44, at 298; see supra Part III.
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by which conventional property rules should be judged legitimate or
illegitimate. The elements may and often do fill in middle-level
concepts and working strategies in different property doctrines, such
as the general presumption that any non-trivial and beneficial use of a
resource establishes a good property claim.157 Yet conventional rules
need not track the elements of labor directly—not if they facilitate
those elements more effectively through indirect strategies.
As a result, it is not automatically self-contradictory or unjust for
a labor- and use-based system of property law to recommend rights to
exclude without express use, claim-marking, or sufficiency
requirements. Productive labor moral norms may justify instituting
two- or multi-level strategies in positive law. Presumptive rules may
be instituted for easy situations when proprietors clearly seem to
deserve property or to be disentitled from having property, and
exceptions or balancing tests may be reserved for borderline cases.
When labor-based norms do justify multi-level reasoning, all the
relevant property rules should be judged in totality as applied across a
representative range of recurring disputes. The standard of judgment
is whether the rules seem to facilitate, require, and protect the free
opportunities of owners to labor for different goals and respect the
claims of non-owners, as a practical and reasonable hypothetical
onlooker would find appropriate. This is the habit of “practical
reason” so lacking in recent property scholarship158—and the mode of
reasoning that welfarists and theorists interested in non-Lockean
theories of rights should consider more closely.
B.

The Practical Case for Rights of Exclusive Control

Once this confusion about practical reasoning is dispelled,
exclusive control becomes easier to justify. Legal officials should
institute usufructs in some situations, rights of exclusive control in
others, and combinations of those two basic alternatives in others.
Each system should be instituted when it seems reasonably likely to
facilitate the free and concurrent exercise of different labor-based
interests—by an owner, by neighbors, and by non-owners with needs
to use the resources in question. Different systems may apply better
to different resources, economies, and communities. In a community
in which fresh water is fairly plentiful for private uses, it may be
appropriate to keep riparian water rights limited, both to conserve

157. See supra Section III.B.
158. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
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river water for public uses and to protect riparian land.159 For land
and tangible personal articles, however, exclusive control makes
considerable sense.
Three reinforcing arguments justify exclusive property from a
labor theory. First, exclusive control expands people’s freedom, their
autonomy, and their capacity to be self-governing agents. As
Simmons explains, “Self-government is only possible . . . if the
external things necessary for carrying out our plans can be kept,
managed, exchanged (etc.) as the plans require. Use rights will not
suffice for any even moderately elaborate plans or projects.”160 In a
system of use rights, every user’s plans may conflict with and require
coordination with the plans of others. In a system with strong control
within clear boundaries, people are freed from needing to coordinate
with others. That freedom empowers them then to dedicate their
resources to ever more individuated and specialized uses—for
residential or commercial goals, for utilitarian or idealistic and
expressive goals, and so on.
Next, exclusive control also serves virtue-theoretic functions. In
Locke’s terms, exclusive control discourages “the Fancy or
Covetousness of the Quarrelsom and Contentious” and encourages
“the use of the Industrious and Rational.”161 In commonsense terms,
control encourages the form of sociability embodied in the phrase,
“good fences make good neighbors.” In a regime with usufructs and
open access, there are plenty of incentives to consume more than
one’s fair share of the resources currently available. There are no
incentives to be self-restrained and to produce more resources; there
are instead incentives to complain when other parties consume more
than their fair shares. Separately, industriousness toward property
encourages important republican civic virtues as well. When people
live in communes or open-access regimes, the communities often
develop family or status hierarchies to settle conflicts.162 Those
hierarchies make leaders bossy and followers passive and servile.163
By contrast, when people manage their own land, they become
habituated to think about managing their own families, jobs, and life
159. See generally Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of
Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990) (discussing the evolution of
proprietary water rights in English and American law as applied to various resource
availability scenarios).
160. SIMMONS, supra note 86, at 275.
161. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.34, at 291.
162. See Ellickson, supra note 4, at 1346–62. Ellickson documented these tendencies in
Israeli kibbutzim, Hutterite colonies, and Woodstock era communes. Id.
163. Id.

95 N.C. L. REV. 413 (2017)

446

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

goals generally. As such, they are more likely to react in a spirited
fashion when someone else presumes to tell them what they may or
may not do on their own lots.
Exclusive ownership has these virtue-inculcating tendencies
because of a third factor: productivity. Quite often, under exclusive
property, “the Property of labour should be able to over-ballance the
Community of Land” and other resources unowned and subject to
open access, because “Labour . . . puts the difference of value on every
thing.”164 For the right resources and conditions (again, land or
chattels, in a community with a commercial economy) exclusionary
rights serve several overlapping functions. Because rights to exclude
others reduce conflicts between different usufruct-holders, they
increase security and facilitate investment and long-range planning.
Because such rights are simpler to administer, they make it easier for
owners to coordinate the uses of their land with other people’s labor
or non-land property. Security, flexibility, and other similar
advantages encourage owners to produce from land what Locke
colorfully estimated as being one hundred or one thousand times as
many conveniences of life as could be produced without property and
intensive cultivation.165
To be sure, all of these justifications are implicitly at least partly
empirical. Yet general knowledge about human behavior also has an
empirical dimension. Since law and politics operate in epistemological
mediocrity, legal officials may legislate relying on these
generalizations and justifications until someone produces more
reliable empirical evidence. Another of the functions of a flourishingbased moral theory is to help develop a presumptive framework for
understanding how people may be predicted to behave in response to
different legal rules. This framework helps identify criteria of
“relevancy” or “salience” to test the framework and its quasiempirical predictions. Here, even if Locke’s multipliers are a bit
hyperbolic, his basic point has empirical support. From the years 1700
to 2000, the average incomes of the peoples in the United States,
Japan, and Western Europe increased roughly fifty-fold,166 and in
these same countries objective metrics of lifespan and health
improved similarly.167 By contrast, the usufructuary property that
164. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.40, at 296.
165. See id. §§ II.40, II.43, at 296, 298 (respectively).
166. See ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, THE ESCAPE FROM HUNGER AND PREMATURE
DEATH, 1700–2100, at xv (2004). It is unclear whether or not this source accounts for
inflation in this calculation.
167. Id.
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Native Americans maintained in game animals limited their economic
activity, the fur trade, to available habitat.168 Anthony Bottomley
discovered a case study in the province of Tripolitania, Libya.
Approximately three percent of land in that province was privately
held, but experts believed that a substantial portion of the land held
in common was as productive as the privately owned land.169 The
property status of the land correlated with the choices of uses, with
the private land being dedicated toward labor-intensive and highvalue products (like almonds) and the common land being used for
non-labor-intensive and lower-value uses (such as grazing and
growing barley).170 Hernando de Soto’s work has shown how
conventional title increases security and growth significantly over
non-conventional, use-based prescriptive claims.171
Of course, these justifications for exclusive property may still be
over-inclusive. Owners may, and in practice some will, use their land
in ways that contravene the expectations just sketched. Still, practical
officials may reasonably bet that selfish priorities will motivate most
owners to defend their lots and use them productively. If and when
they do, officials will need to ask the question created by any
consequentialist system of reasoning: How overinclusive or
underinclusive can a specific legal rule be before its justification
ceases to justify it?
In addition, overinclusivity may not undermine a presumptive
right of exclusive property; it may instead justify limits. Productive
labor theory supplies a conceptual structure and normative
vocabulary for narrowing and settling disagreements over property.
Here is where productive labor theory resembles Smith’s two-tiered
portrait of exclusion and governance.172 Exclusive rights apply
presumptively when clear boundaries and strong delineations of
managerial authority facilitate different people’s labor more

168. See ANN M. CARLOS & FRANK D. LEWIS, COMMERCE BY A FROZEN SEA:
NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE EUROPEAN FUR TRADE 182–83 (2010).
169. Anthony Bottomley, The Effect of the Common Ownership of Land Upon
Resource Allocation in Tripolitania, 39 LAND ECON. 91, 91 n.2 (1963).
170. Id. at 92–93. See generally Louis De Alessi, Gains from Private Property: The
Empirical Evidence, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 90
(Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003) (presenting examples of other
similar studies, most of which involve the husbanding and production of animals).
171. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE
REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (June Abbott trans., Harper & Row 1989)
(chronicling the phenomenon of Peru’s black market economy in the late 1970s through
the early 1980s).
172. See Smith, supra note 18, at 453–55; see also text accompanying supra note 18.
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effectively than use-based property systems.173 When clear and
convincing proof suggests that owners are not using exclusive rights as
productively or as vigilantly as they ought, the system may institute
“governance” overrides divesting owners of their rights.174
Furthermore, use-based “governance” overrides may also be
appropriate when non-owners have unusually strong sufficiency or
necessity claims on owned resources.175
C.

The Conceptual Character of Exclusive Property

This multi-tiered approach to property is not appreciated
sufficiently, largely because contemporary theorists assume that a
classical liberal theory of property must justify property understood
as a normative relation in which an “owner has a right to exclude
others and owes no further obligation to them.”176 As shown,
statements like these assume that classical liberal property has no
relation to interests in flourishing or social relations. Statements like
these are troubling in two conceptual respects as well.
One conceptual issue relates to the character of “property.”
Property rights can be strong without being unqualified rights to
exclude. Historically, in Anglo-American law, property has not been
understood as an unqualified right to exclude.177 One encyclopedia
defined property as “that dominion or indefinite right of user and
disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or
subjects, and generally to the exclusion of all others.”178 Analytically,
this understanding is better conceived of as a right of exclusive use.
“Rights” of “exclusive use” give proprietors presumptive priority to
possess, control, and manage their things for a wide range of goals
(hence, in the encyclopedia definition, “indefinite” “user and
disposition”). Yet such rights are limited (only “generally to the
exclusion” of others), and they are limited specifically to reconcile the
use-interests that owners and non-owners have in relation to ownable

173. See Smith, supra note 18, at 453–55.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Alexander, supra note 67, at 747.
177. See Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908) (“A traveler on a highway who
finds it obstructed from a sudden and temporary cause may pass upon the adjoining land
without becoming a trespasser because of the necessity.”); see also Epstein, supra note 4,
at 2108 n.47, 2109–10 (citing Ploof, 71 A. at 189)
178. Property, THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 284 (John
Houston Merrill ed., 1892).

95 N.C. L. REV. 413 (2017)

2017]

LABOR, EXCLUSION, AND FLOURISHING

449

things.179 Rights of exclusive use can expire when owners do not
deserve broad managerial control, or when non-owners have
particularly strong claims to access or use others’ resources.180 Thus,
when scholars criticize the Anglo-American legal tradition for
enforcing an unqualified or overly strong right to exclude,181 they
criticize it for a commitment alien to the sources.
Although this criticism is misplaced, it is understandable, because
the prima facie claim for trespass does seem to embody an
unqualified right to exclude.182 Yet this perception reveals the second
misconception—that the analytical content of property lies in the
prima facie cause of action for trespass to land. Property rights, like
all other substantive rights protected in tort (and by contract, or in
remedies), have a complex relation to the torts (and other corrective
private law doctrines) by which they are protected. Different prima
facie torts, defenses, and remedial doctrines are all structured to
implement the norms prescribed by the substantive property rights a
community finds agreeable. By the same token, however, to identify
the analytical property rights protected in a legal system, one cannot
look solely to a tort like trespass. One must instead perform the legal
equivalent of a subtraction operation. The prima facie cause of action
supplies the minuend. Subtrahends come from relevant defenses,
remedy limitations, and extra requirements to the prima facie action
for special situations. The difference in this operation is the analytical
“property” that owners have in positive law.183
179. See Eric R. Claeys, The Concept Property, from a Practical Point of View 5 (Jan. 5,
2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2406052 [https://perma.cc/X6FR-XWF8]; see also MACLEOD, supra note 23, at 36–49
(presenting the concept “property” as a sphere of dominion in relation to a resource
mediated by use interests); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back
Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 380–93 (2003) (presenting the legal concept “property” as
a right of exclusive use as portrayed in the writings of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke).
Recent works conceiving property as a right to exclude do not differ materially. See, e.g.,
J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997); Merrill & Smith, supra note 4,
at 359. Although these works describe the right to exclude as core to property, they
construe that exclusionary core to allow for limited rights of use or access in individuated
contexts.
180. Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 17–26
(2011) (book review) (presenting the concept “property” as a right of exclusive use).
181. See Alexander, supra note 67, at 747.
182. See Heller v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 265 F. 192, 194 (2d Cir. 1920) (“Every
unauthorized entry on another’s property is a trespass and any person who makes such an
entry is a trespasser.”); Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371, 372 (1835) (“[E]very
unauthorized entry, and therefore unlawful entry, is a trespass . . . .”).
183. See Eric R. Claeys, On the “Property” and the “Tort” in Trespass, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 122–47 (John Oberdiek ed.,
2014); see also JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 215–16 (1992); Richard A.
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D. Illustrations
1. Trespass
In common law, trespass to land institutes a rough and ready
presumption implementing all the goals explained in Section IV.B.
Because trespass is organized around a simple “don’t cross without
permission” norm,184 it embodies and promotes claim-marking.
Separately, trespass’s clear legal structure facilitates
heterogeneous uses of land. The Nature Conservancy and other
environmental groups acquire land to conserve it for conservationist
or aesthetic environmental goals.185 Trespass rules protect these more
passive “uses” of land on the same plane as more active uses. First
Amendment “compelled speech” doctrines protect landowners from
being forced to let non-owners enter and use their lots as platforms to
propagate ideological messages with which they disagree.186 The First
Amendment reiterates what trespass already embodies. When an
owner has a right to exclude unconsented entries, that structure
makes part of the owner’s presumptive legitimate “control” and
“uses” the right to manage the ideological goals with which her land is
associated.187 Recent political theory and property scholarship has
taken an interest in common-ownership regimes, on the ground that
they create the “community” apparently lacking in a liberal political
order.188 Yet it is much harder for communal groups to practice
communal ways of life if outsiders challenge their control over their
land on the ground that the groups are not using the land
productively enough. Even if it sounds paradoxical, exclusive control
provides security for heterodox communal ways of life.
This same understanding helps address another possible
question: whether an owner deserves “property” in the control and
Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
165, 165–69 (1974). Although this text focuses on torts, similar processes occur with public
law. There, common law substantive rights are often limited by public law prohibitions—
and then enhanced by public law permits or waivers.
184. See supra Section II.A.
185. See, e.g., Land Conservation: Balancing the Needs of People and Nature, THE
NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/urgentissues/land-conservation
/index.htm [https://perma.cc/Y5EQ-47VC].
186. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568–70 (1972).
187. See id.
188. See generally, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons,
110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001) (introducing a justification for communal property that
facilitates cooperation among proprietors); Anna di Robilant, The Virtues of Common
Ownership, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1359 (2011) (explaining that common ownership can lead to
more cooperative, active, and solidaristic communities).
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use of a lot that is not being improved and is instead being held
speculatively.189 In a simple, prelegal sense, the speculator who does
not improve land is not using it productively. Once the community
has money and exchange, however, that speculator’s conduct may be
justifiable. If the speculator sees development potential in a lot, the
speculator labors by discovering that potential, acquiring the lot, and
managing it until he can find a higher-valuing user and complete a
sale. When the speculator pays the original owner a price she finds
agreeable, he contributes to her survival or comfort. If he finds a
higher-value user and resells to that user, he indirectly hastens the
process by which the land is used productively. At least in principle,
then, someone who holds onto land speculatively in the short term
can contribute indirectly to greater productive labor in the long term.
Additionally, if a trespassory structure can facilitate beneficial
uses in all these respects, the decision in Jacque seems more
defensible. Jacque is a hard case in part because the Jacques were
using the disputed land for passive uses—peace and quiet, aesthetic
enjoyment, or perhaps even just as a buffer between their residential
uses of their house and their neighbors’ land uses.190 To that extent,
the Jacques’ uses were defensible, and not very different from other
passive—but no less legitimate—uses, like those of the Nature
Conservancy or someone making a compelled speech argument.
Jacque is also a close case because the Jacques may have been acting
irrationally due to their mistaken understanding of adverse
possession.191 Here, however, trespass justified not by whether it is
overinclusive in any single dispute but by whether, in the range of
situations to which it applies, it facilitates productive labor by all
owners and non-owners. Other owners in the Jacques’ shoes might
have had good-faith desires and rational grounds to keep the field in
dispute undisturbed. These considerations do not flatly require that
the Jacques prevail, but they do make the judgment in Jacque seem
far more sensible than it seems in post-Coasean transaction-cost or
progressive scholarship.

189. Similar issues arise in intellectual property about the role played by intermediaries
that acquire patents and resell or license them to higher-valuing users. See, e.g., eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390–93 (2006).
190. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W. 2d 154, 157 ¶ 6 (1997); see also text
accompanying supra note 36.
191. Jacque, 563 N.W. 2d at 157 ¶ 3; see text accompanying supra note 36.
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2. Necessity
Again, however, the presumption for exclusive control is subject
to limitations, including the privilege of necessity.192 In some
situations, someone may be able to show clearly and convincingly that
her need for a resource is graver and more urgent than a conventional
owner’s intentions—as in cases in which the necessity proviso
arises.193 The necessity privilege institutes in tort doctrine a moral
limitation approximating the necessity proviso in morality.194 This
privilege (in the nature of a defense) entitles a person to enter and
commandeer someone else’s property when doing so seems
reasonably necessary to avoid a serious threat to life or destruction of
one’s own property.195
Now, within any legal system, people may argue where to draw
the lines between the presumption for exclusive control and the
exceptional circumstances where “necessities” privilege entries that
would otherwise be trespasses. Jacque also illustrates this point:
perhaps the scope of “necessity” should be broadened to cover not
only emergencies where people and property face serious harm, but
also problems like the blizzard in Jacque, in which lack of access
threatens non-dangerous but serious inconvenience. Here too, the
role of productive labor theory is not to determine a specific result for
a hard case, but to set up the normative framework in which that
result is reasoned. Productive labor theory creates a general starting
presumption for the Jacques and other owners’ having a right to
exclude, because exclusive control ordinarily encourages productivity
and clear ownership claims. If Steenberg Homes or some other nonowner wants to plead an exception, they must show that the exception
will not undermine those goals. In that spirit, the Jacques could ask
why Steenberg Homes promised to deliver a mobile home to a
Wisconsin customer in February, or whether Steenberg Homes
deserved the benefit of a necessity exception when its assistant
manager was witnessed not to have “give[n] a —” why the Jacques

192. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
193. See supra Section III.D.
194. Benamon v. Soo Line R. Co., 689 N.E.2d 366, 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (“The
private necessity privilege allows one to enter the premises of another without permission
in an emergency situation when such entry is reasonably necessary to avoid serious harm.”
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 345, 197 (AM. LAW INST. 1965))).
195. Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra note 29, § 197.
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protested and to have giggled after being told that the mobile home
had crossed their lot.196
3. Adverse Possession
Trespass facilitates labor on the basis of another assumption:
even if an exclusionary property right does not expressly require
owners to use their lots productively and vigilantly, self-interest will
motivate most owners to use their lots in those ways anyway. In some
repeat class of cases, however, there may be clear and convincing
proof that a class of owners are neglecting their productive use and
claim-marking responsibilities. In those cases, productive labor theory
permits overrides.
In common law, adverse possession seems well suited to institute
such an override. Adverse possession entitles an adverse occupant to
repel a suit for trespass—and divest the title owner of title—if she
occupies the owner’s land exclusively, openly, continuously, and
adversely for the local jurisdiction’s limitations period for trespass.197
Adverse possession is a vexing doctrine to justify. Some leading
accounts justify the defense on the ground that it rewards “the
productive use of land” by the adverse possessor.198 Other accounts
maintain that it quiets title to properties burdened by stale land
claims.199
Although adverse possession serves both of these functions, in a
labor-based framework both are subsidiary to a third function: to
disentitle title owners who violate the two prerequisites of labor. By
definition, any owner who does not repel an adverse occupancy for
several years is violating her responsibility to mark her claims to her
lot.200 As nineteenth-century squatters rights disputes confirm, claim
neglect breeds conflict.201 Squatters come to believe they have good
196. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Wis. 1997).
197. See, e.g., Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990); Mahoney v.
Tara, L.L.C., 107 A.3d 887, 890–91 (Vt. 2014).
198. Canjar v. Cole, 770 N.W.2d 449, 454 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009); see, e.g., Lee Anne
Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 1037, 1064–66 (2006); Larissa Katz, The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession:
Sovereignty and Revolution in Property Law, 55 MCGILL L.J. 47, 77–78 (2010).
199. See, e.g., Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135,
135 (1918); Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 674–80 (1986).
200. See supra Section III.C.
201. See, e.g., PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 145–
48, 161–64, 225–27 (1968); EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL,
PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE LAND
OWNERSHIP 55–63 (2010).
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claims to the land they occupy and use, neighbors and other
onlookers come to sympathize with squatters, and those claims and
sympathies undermine respect for the rule of law.202 The conduct that
supplies direct proof of claim neglect provides strong circumstantial
evidence of unproductiveness. Now, when I say that this neglectpunishing function is adverse possession’s most fundamental function,
I do not mean to suggest that adverse possession disregards the labor
of adverse possessors. Taken together, the requirements of
occupancy, exclusivity, and openness assign title in the individual who
has staked a clear claim to the lot in dispute, and it is reasonable to
presume that such an individual uses the land more productively than
anyone else. Nor do I mean to deny that adverse possession quiets
title; the doctrine does avoid title disputes, by establishing title on
possession when evidence seems likely to be stale. Nevertheless, the
neglect-punishing function precedes the other two logically; the other
two do not come into play until a title owner forfeits his claim of title.
As Carol Rose explains, adverse possession is not so much “a reward
to the useful laborer at the expense of the sluggard” as it is a
recognition of the “useful labor [in] the very act of speaking clearly
and distinctly about one’s claims to property.”203
Of course, adverse possession generates further overinclusivity
and underinclusivity problems. If a neglectful owner evicts an adverse
occupant just one month short of the limitations period, she seems to
escape on a technicality. The rules that apply to wholesale squatting
cases may not apply well to backyard boundary disputes.204 Here too,
however, a system of trespass plus adverse possession needs to be
judged by how well it facilitates productive labor, within clear
property claims, in totality. Any discretion used to deal with
opportunistic neglectful owners could also be used by opportunistic
squatters and could destabilize the functions of exclusive control. A
prudent official might still build more discretion into adverse
possession doctrine, but he would need to consider the pros and the
cons of discretion, using rough consequentialist forecasts, before
deciding whether to do so.
Similarly, even if a system of trespass-plus-adverse-possession is
imperfect, the alternatives could be worse. If common law land-based
202. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 201, at 225–27; PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note
201, at 55–63.
203. Rose, supra note 138, at 79, 82.
204. For a helpful survey of the ways in which courts apply the same black-letter rules
differently to different cases, see generally R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and
Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L. Q. 331 (1983).
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torts built in use limits, as common law appropriative water rights do,
any of a multitude of non-owners could accuse an owner of under
using her property. And after the state disentitled that title owner, it
would then need to determine which of those non-owners was the
most deserving replacement owner. In short, although adverse
possession suffers from overinclusivity and underinclusivity problems,
those problems seem prices worth paying to get the advantages of
two- or multi-level systems of regulation.
V. DEONTOLOGICAL LIMITS ON EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY
As the last Part showed, productive labor theory supplies an
indirect, presumptive justification for exclusive property, and it also
marks off outer limits on that justification. As Section IV.D showed,
that justification can adapt legal property rights to conform to the
moral requirements associated with productive use, claim-marking,
and the necessity proviso. Yet Part IV did not study how exclusive
property rights accommodate the sufficiency proviso.
A. Exclusive Control and the Sufficiency Proviso
The sufficiency proviso is not as easy to reconcile to property
rights as the other three components of labor. Although exclusive
property gives owners more privacy and freedom to pursue their own
individual goals, it also restricts non-owners’ opportunities for similar
privacy. Although exclusive land ownership may incentivize owners
to produce more food, shelter, and other resources, it denies nonowners opportunities to produce resources from the same land. A
labor-based justification for exclusive property needs to explain how
it deals with these sufficiency claims. At least superficially, such a
justification seems to disregard those claims. Trespass has a necessity
privilege but no sufficiency defenses. That perception leads some
scholars to assume that labor-based property “ha[s] nothing to do
with society and its collective good,” including but not limited to the
needs of non-owners.205
Nozick disagreed; he argued that increased productivity from
ownership “satisfies the intent behind the ‘enough and as good left
over’ proviso.”206 To some readers, however, that response seems to
undermine the force and coherency of labor theory. Rights-based
205. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON
THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 92 (2007).
206. NOZICK, supra note 83, at 177 (quoting, with slight alterations, LOCKE, supra note
8, § II.33, at 291).
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theories seem most forceful when they make “entitlement . . . a matter
of natural right, superior to all manipulations of the state in the
interest of social welfare”; a right-holder must be able to insist that
the right be protected though the heavens fall (fiat justitia, ruat
caelum) or else the right is not really a right.207
B.

The Deontological Character of Productive Labor Theory

Herein lies another misperception about flourishing-based
practical reasoning. Many theories of rights, including many
flourishing-based theories, do not have the character just described.
John Rawls once protested: “All ethical doctrines worth our attention
take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did
not would simply be irrational, crazy.”208 Rawls also offered a more
attractive and capacious understanding of rights-based theories:
“deontological” theories. Productive labor theory is deontological in
Rawls’s sense without generating absolute or illimitable rights.
In Rawls’s usage, a theory of politics is deontological if it makes
the Right lexically prior to the Good.209 The Good consists of the
general advantages a proposal is likely to confer on the citizenry at
large.210 In a deontological morality, the Right consists of important
normative interests held by individual citizens.211 So understood,
“deontology” allows a political community to pursue socially
advantageous policies; its main constraint is to make the community
pursue chosen policies without trenching on citizens’ strongest
individual interests.212
Even though Locke and Rawls’s theories of politics differ in
many other respects, productive labor theory satisfies Rawls’s
207. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 108 (1993). Although
this passage criticized a theory reconciling adverse possession with a Nozickean theory of
property, the general criticism applies identically to any rights-based theory claiming to
reconcile exclusive ownership and sufficiency-based limitations.
208. RAWLS, supra note 22, at 30. Similarly, in an entry on deontology in a philosophy
encyclopedia, Larry Alexander and Michael Moore believe that “[t]he most familiar forms
of deontology . . . hold that some choices cannot be justified by their effects—that no
matter how morally good their consequences, some choices are morally forbidden.” Larry
Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/#DeoFoiCon [https://perma
.cc/2AUU-2UFM]. “Deontology” does not bar the consideration of all choices or
consequences, only choices or consequences particularly antithetical to the interests of
right-bearing and rational individuals. Id.
209. See RAWLS, supra note 22, at 30–32; see also Alexander & Moore, supra note 208
(offering the definition in text as a standard definition of deontology).
210. Id. at 399.
211. Id. at 28–32.
212. Id. at 30–32.
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definition of deontology. Rational and sociable flourishing reconciles
individual rights and the common good. In relation to property, the
Right consists of the interest every citizen has in surviving, in having
an equal opportunity to satisfy basic preconditions for making her life
better, and in being free to pursue a distinct program for her own
improvement.213 The common good does not consist of any policy that
suits the preferences of a bare majority of citizens. Because citizens
are presumed to be rational and sociable,214 as an ideal matter, the
common good in politics resembles the common interests of a
partnership in law; it consists of “the good of every particular
Member of th[e] Society, as far as by common Rules, it can be
provided for.”215 Since the common good is defined as the concurrent
and free exercise of individual rights by rational and sociable
citizens,216 the Right is lexically prior to the Good.217
So understood, deontology imposes one last major constraint on
exclusive property. Morally, the sufficiency proviso entitles all citizens
to equal opportunities to access and to use some reasonable share of a
community’s resources.218 The proviso does not stop the community
from extinguishing moral usufructs in positive law in the course of
instituting private property. As John Finnis puts it, however, owned
resources remain in principle “morally subject to a kind of inchoate
trust, mortgage, lien, or usufruct in favour of” non-owners.219 In the
worst possible case, exclusive ownership is justifiable only to the
extent that it seems practically likely to leave non-owners with as
many opportunities for survival and improvement as they would have
had if the owned resource had remained in usufruct. Preferably,
exclusive ownership should benefit non-owners indirectly. Some
owners should use ownership to produce conveniences of life, and
those conveniences should circulate to non-owners.

213. See generally id. (developing a theory for societal justice).
214. Id. at 142–45.
215. LOCKE, supra note 8, § I.92, at 210; accord id. § II.134, at 356.
216. RAWLS, supra note 22, at 142–45.
217. See Michael Zuckert, Reconsidering Lockean Rights Theory: A Reply to My
Critics, 32 INTERPRETATION 257, 264 (2005); see also MYERS, supra note 86, at 12
(arguing that “Locke affirms the broad plurality of human goods and insists that public life
be governed by a deontological doctrine of personal rights or self-ownership”).
218. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.33, at 291.
219. John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 51 (Jules Coleman et al. eds., 2004).
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Sufficiency and the Right to Alienate Property

In principle, it may be possible to meet that adequacy criterion
through one or both of two overlapping strategies. In some cases,
non-owners do not have strong or particularized interests in plans to
use any given resource—only a general interest in having access to
some resources for their own life needs and goals. In that case, their
sufficiency interests may be satisfied by making property alienable,
and instituting a common coinage and system of commerce.220
When this strategy suffices, the sufficiency proviso is embodied
not by any element of or defense to trespass, but in the powers to
alienate property, to acquire it, and to make contracts. At least in
theory, when exclusive ownership encourages owners to produce
surplus resources, non-owners can earn money and then use earnings
to buy the goods they need for their own life goals. As Buckle puts it,
“[t]he bounty produced by the propertied extends to the
unpropertied, improving their condition.”221 If the unpropertied
“actually benefit from the appropriative acts of the propertied[,]”
exclusive ownership not only facilitates labor but also respects the
interests marked off by the sufficiency proviso.222 Of course, it is an
implicitly empirical question whether a given system of property does
in fact encourage produce to circulate to the unpropertied. Again,
however, at least in principle, there must be some situations in which
ownership is productive enough, and commerce robust enough, to
satisfy the adequacy criterion set by the sufficiency proviso. In
practice in American, European, and Japanese economies since 1700,
rising tides have lifted most boats.223 And if a given system of property
seems unlikely to satisfy this adequacy criterion, exceptions may be
instituted. The system may scale back the scope of exclusive property
and institute stronger use claims, or it may remedy the problems by
instituting public programs ensuring the needy opportunities to work
and earn basic material support.224

220. The economy and these legal rights also relieve pressure on the necessity proviso
for people who are starving, but to the extent that people are in extreme need and have
“no means to subsist otherwise[,]” they continue to have claims on other forms of
charitable or public assistance. See LOCKE, supra note 8, § I.42, at 170.
221. BUCKLE, supra note 13, at 154.
222. Id. at 154–55.
223. See text accompanying supra notes 166–67.
224. Locke himself proposed programs offering support to the needy who were
incapable of work and jobs for the needy who could work. See LOCKE, An Essay on the
Poor Law, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 7, at 182–98.
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D. Sufficiency and Implied Easements
The justification discussed in the last Section is most persuasive
when people without property have inchoate interests in using some
resources but lack strong claims to particular resources. The
justification is not nearly so persuasive when some community
members have strong interests in particular resources. In those
situations, deontological constraints justify further limits—express
sufficiency-based limitations—on exclusive property rights.
The simplest doctrines illustrating this possibility are easements
of access. Notwithstanding his “despotic dominion” sound bite,
Blackstone specified that private rights to land were subject to many
different “hereditaments,” which we might call “implied easements”
or “implied rights of way.”225 Non-owners had usufructuary rights, as
specified by common law and background statutes, to enter owned
land for limited purposes: pursuing game, fishing, grazing livestock,
collecting wood, and other similar uses.226 In antebellum American
common law, these use-based exceptions significantly scaled back the
trespassory and exclusive character of land ownership.227
In fairly rural conditions, these implied rights of way are
permissible and probably necessary limitations on exclusive
ownership. When most land is undeveloped in a community, citizens
cannot expect to acquire materials necessary for survival or
improvement from labor, savings, and commerce. Many American
states fit this description at one time; before the twentieth century, in
many American states only one percent to twenty percent of owned
land was improved.228
If and when land is developed and becomes productive later,
owners may then reasonably argue that production and commerce
obviate the need for these implied easements of access. Those
demands, and pushback by indigent residents, will make property law
(depending on one’s point of view) social and flexible, or chaotic and
indeterminate. Yet the same basic points continue to apply. In a
system of otherwise exclusive property, strong sufficiency claims may
225. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *32.
226. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *32–34.
227. See Brian Sawers, The Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land, 83 TEMP. L.
REV. 665, 675–79 (2011); John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American
Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 549–53 (1996).
228. See Sawers, supra note 227, at 676 (“While as much as twenty percent of
Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, and Kentucky was improved in 1850, less than one percent
of Texas or Florida was. Although fencing may be the norm today (particularly in the
East), America was largely open before 1870 and fenced land was ‘exceptional.’ ”
(footnotes omitted)).
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be accommodated by instituting use-based rights of access as
limitations on broad rights of exclusion. Even if local judgments are
not uniform enough, and even if there is not enough specific empirical
information, to clarify where exclusion should end and rights of access
should begin, productive labor theory institutes a multi-level structure
giving ownership and sufficiency claims their due.
VI. LABOR, FLOURISHING, AND PERFECTIONISM
This Article has now demonstrated its first claim: Productive
labor theory justifies property understood as a presumptive right of
exclusive control, and the presumption may be overridden when
owners fail to labor or when non-owners have strong sufficiency or
necessity claims. And the principles proving that first claim supply the
supports needed to justify property in a more satisfying manner. This
Part focuses on the first of those supports. Productive labor theory
grounds property rights in flourishing-based moral principles, but it
does so in such a manner as to minimize government decision makers’
opportunities to treat property as a right to do what they believe will
contribute to everyone’s flourishing.
A. Perfectionism: Theory Versus Practice
Although progressive property is not necessarily hostile to
property, it may inadvertently threaten property. Again, A Statement
of Progressive Property celebrates the “plural and incommensurable
values” property implicates, and the values the cosigners affiliate with
property—security,
knowledge,
wealth,
flourishing,
and
environmental stewardship, to name a few—seem hard to reconcile.229
This portrait of property legitimates a train of reasoning: an owner
values A; a non-owner values B; A and B are incommensurable; and
since there is no other way to resolve the value conflict, a legal
decision maker must, however reluctantly, prefer one to the other.
Property gets reduced to a right to use one’s own as judges or
regulators deem necessary for the flourishing of others or the
community at large.
Productive labor theory is structured to anticipate and avoid
legitimating that train of reasoning. Exclusive rights give different
individuals freedom to decide for themselves whether, on their own
lots, to value A, B, or other sources of gratification. In a few cases,
such as in dire emergencies, value choices are unavoidable. In many

229. Alexander et al., supra note 6, at 743–44.
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others, legal officials can promote everyone’s flourishing simply by
requiring everyone to respect one another’s property. Yet when legal
officials can avoid pitting specific land uses against one another and
do so anyway, they indirectly undermine the conditions for
everyone’s flourishing.
Section II.B recounted the most basic reason why: reliably often,
public officials know significantly less than affected citizens about
whether or how a given resource will help them flourish, simply
because self-interest gives the citizens incentives to consider those
questions more seriously than the officials will. Yet there are other
reasons. First, all too often, people get blinded by “self-love,” and
people so blinded will agitate for policies that are “partial to [the
interests of] themselves and their Friends.”230 Here, Locke expresses
in his vernacular concepts similar to Federalist No. 10’s account of
faction,231 or public choice and economic theories of regulation.232 If
property rights are directly linked to flourishing in politics, nonowners—and especially wealthy non-owners—are likely to lobby the
government to redistribute property on the ground that they will
promote flourishing throughout the community better than the
owners themselves will.
Second, politics attracts political extremists. Political life,
especially in a large liberal nation-state, attracts “Quarrelsom and
Contentious” character types who harbor extreme religious or
ideological opinions.233 Politics also attracts character types who love
eminence, and when such types have leisure they may be quarrelsome
and contentious in pursuit of political position.234 Character types like
these are likely to be attracted, as practically-minded citizens are not,
to reform programs that require property to be used for the common
good, in ways that are demanding and likely to frustrate owners’
private plans.
These risks cannot be wholly avoided in property or in any other
field of law. But productive labor theory structures property to
230. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.13, at 275.
231. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 46–49 (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, &
John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
232. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 3, 5 (1971) (explaining the promulgation and enforcement of regulations
regarding economic disputes primarily as a function of some regulated parties’ interests in
gaining competitive advantages over other regulated parties).
233. LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.34, at 291; see also LOCKE, supra note 27, bk. IV, chs.
xvi–xx, at 657–719 (outlining how people form groups founded upon mistaken religious
dogmas or secular opinions).
234. MYERS, supra note 86, at 195.
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minimize the risks. If one believes, as classical liberals do, that
political life is extremely partisan and that people’s needs and
interests toward different resources vary extremely widely, legal rules
that focus heavily on flourishing will unfortunately boomerang. Such
rules may restrict freedom and equal opportunity as properties
become restricted by side limitations related to different flourishingrelated needs. Flourishing-related arguments may attract special
interests and encourage property to get caught up in ideological
conflicts over property. And since flourishing-related legal tests
require context-specific balancing, they give greater influence to
insiders.235 More marginalized groups in a community will benefit
from simple and uniform property rules; insiders will better exploit
ambiguity. Obviously, these concerns will not arise in every dispute,
and they cannot be proven in any conclusive way. As the rest of this
Part will suggest, however, the concerns do arise in some of the fields
of law most celebrated in progressive property scholarship.
B.

Rights to Roam

The first example consists of statutory rights to roam. Sweden
has long recognized Allemansrätt (translated “everyman’s right”).
Allemansrätt is a right of way entitling non-owners to roam
countryside owned by others.236 In 2000, England and Wales enacted
the Countryside and Rights of Way Act codifying rights to roam over
mapped open country, mountains, and coastal land.237 In 2003,
Scotland enacted an even broader roaming right, giving roamers
rights to cross most land for purposes of recreation, education, or
passage.238 Progressive property works often cite rights to roam as an
example of progressive property in action.239 Progressive property
works tend to ask whether roaming rights serve valuable life goals
(such works say “yes”), and then to ask whether owners have any
235. See supra Section IV.
236. See Kevin Colby, Public Access to Private Land—Allemansrätt in Sweden, 15
LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 253, 253–54 (1988); Roam Free in Sweden, VISIT SWEDEN,
http://www.visitsweden.com/sweden/Things-to-do/Nature--Outdoors/Nature-loving-Sweden
/Roam-free-in-Sweden/ [http://perma.cc/82DF-EN8F].
237. Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, c. 37, § 2 (Eng. & Wales); see
COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO OPEN COUNTRYSIDE,
2006–07, HC 91, at 9 (UK), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect
/cmpubacc/91/91.pdf [http://perma.cc/283F-QXQQ].
238. Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, (ASP 2) §§ 1(3), 6, 9.
239. See Lovett, supra note 63 (describing the Land Reform (Scotland) Act of 2003 as
an example of progressive property in action); see also FREYFOGLE, supra note 76, at 250–
51; Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle of
Sticks, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 404–12 (2007).
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interests in exclusive control concrete and immediate enough to
override roaming rights (such works say “no”).240
Productive labor theory offers a less sanguine assessment of
roaming rights. The problems do not arise because roaming falls
outside the scope of morally legitimate activity. When labor is
grounded in relation to rational flourishing, the use of land for
physical exercise and recreational enjoyment constitutes moral
labor.241 Yet it does not necessarily follow that mandated roaming
rights are desirable. A government could facilitate the same
flourishing-related activities by buying or condemning scenic land and
paths, and converting them into parks or trails managed by the
government or a public delegate. Although purchase or
condemnation would be more expensive, they would keep brighter
lines between private property and public recreational functions. And
if one thinks through why condemnation is expensive, those costs
bring to light adverse social consequences from roaming statutes.
Those consequences have not been adequately considered in
scholarship supportive of roaming rights.
One issue is a short-term/long-term problem. Conventional
portraits of roaming rights may overemphasize the demands of
roamers and underemphasize the impact of roaming rights on
ownership. This imbalance is understandable. A roamer wants to
derive present enjoyment from crossing a particular plot of land. It
can seem churlish for an analyst to point out that, once roamers have
some right to enter land, they might not stick to the trails or stick to
hiking. Furthermore, the concerns that trouble landowners—lack of
security, risks of accident—are not certain to occur, and the resultant
harms will take years to arise if they ever really occur.
Nevertheless, a moral theory needs a satisfying way to reconcile
both sets of concerns. Moreover, there is at least some evidence that
roaming rights chill land use. Swedish farmers have had to confront
roamers to stop them from picking crops, and other landowners have
complained that roaming rights have interfered with their
opportunities to put their land to more active uses.242 These abstract
and long-to-ripen conflicts may restrain land ownership. In a recent
study of land sales in England and Wales, Jonathan Klick and Gideon
240. See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U.
TORONTO L.J. 275, 298–301 (2009).
241. See infra notes 96–99, 115–17 and accompanying text; accord Lovett, supra note
63, at 760–77 (surveying legislative reform efforts and arguments by Scottish reformers
seeking to expand access for recreational roaming).
242. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 236, at 259–63.
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Parchomovsky discovered that 10% increases in roaming access
correlated with 8% and 6% drops, respectively, in the sales price of
land covered by reforms executed in the year 2000.243 Those price
drops do not automatically prove that covered land is less usable now
than it was before 2000, or that roaming rights are undesirable. At a
minimum, however, they confirm that market buyers perceive land as
less valuable for their planned uses. In a rights-based framework, if
title owners are making some valuable use of their land, their
concerns receive presumptive weight.244
Separately, current scholarship may not adequately portray the
class and geographical overtones of roaming rights. In a country with
a developed economy, the land most likely to be roamed on will be
rural and the likeliest roamers will be urban residents.245 Exclusive
property rights express one normative message: if people want to live
urban lives most of the time and roam recreationally occasionally,
they need to convince rural owners that their temporary interests in
roaming will not jeopardize farmers’ more durable plans for roamedon land. A roaming regime expresses a more partisan message: rural
landowners must respect the land rights of urban owners when they
come to town, but their lots are servient to the recreational interests
of urban residents who choose to roam in the country.246
Productive labor theory does not flatly prohibit rights to roam. In
communities (like Sweden) where such rights have been recognized
by long usage,247 roaming rights could end up being another form of
implied easement that all citizens accept and recognize as part of land
ownership. Yet because productive labor theory supplies a strong
justification for exclusive property, it makes more salient than
progressive theories the long-term effects of repeat entries by
strangers on owned land. Furthermore, because productive labor
theory keeps the exceptions to exclusive ownership fairly narrow, it
judges roamers’ sufficiency claims by a stricter standard. Even if
recreational walking contributes to rational forms of improvement, it
does not contribute to a dimension of flourishing that is basic or
imperative. In this respect, roaming rights differ from most if not all
243. John Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude: An
Empirical Assessment, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 29–39),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755613 [https://perma.cc/DF6A-MN6J
(staff-uploaded archive)].
244. See supra Section III.B.
245. For example, in Sweden in the 1980s, one expert estimated that only 125,000 of
8,000,000 had land worth roaming. See Colby, supra note 236, at 257.
246. See Klick & Parchomovsky, supra note 243, at 39.
247. Katz, supra note 240, at 298 n.70.
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of the rights of way familiar in Anglo-American law—hunting,
grazing, and necessity-based emergency entrances.248 In short,
productive labor theory helps clarify the case for exclusive ownership,
and it keeps rural property from getting entangled in regional “way of
life” conflicts between farmers and urban recreational roamers.
C.

Landmark Laws and Penn Central

Landmark laws provide another helpful illustration. The bestknown landmark law—New York City’s—generated the case that led
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York.249 When a site is old enough and is determined
(in New York City’s administrative code’s terms) to have “a special
character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of
the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state
or nation,”250 a landmark commission may prevent changes to the site
if such changes would detract from its public interest or value.251
Although landmark laws raise a range of interesting issues, they
are interesting here252 because they highlight important differences
between productive labor theory and leading progressive property
works. Progressive works have been sympathetic toward landmark
laws,253 most often because they express a communitarian norm
whereby an owner may justly be prevented from using his property
“in some way that the community regards as against its collective
interest.”254 Yet New York’s track record with landmark laws (New
York’s scheme just celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 2015)255 may
confirm some of the concerns about perfectionist theories of property
regulation.
Productive labor theory does not make landmarking schemes
flatly inappropriate, but it does portray them fairly skeptically. In
248. See text accompanying supra note 226.
249. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
250. N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 25-302(n) (2015).
251. Id. § 25-302(x).
252. Among other things, this Article abstracts away from constitutional doctrinal
questions about whether any takings case law should treat landmark designations as
takings. This Article instead critiques landmark laws and relevant inverse condemnation
policies.
253. See Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1369, 1403–05 (2013) (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104) (analyzing Penn Central, a
case in which the Court determined landmark laws do not constitute takings, and asserting
that the criticism elicited by the Court’s decision is unwarranted).
254. Alexander, supra note 67, at 791, 793.
255. What Happened in 1965?, NYC LANDMARKS 50, http://www.nyclandmarks50.org
/history_and_education.html [https://perma.cc/RG9P-68DW].
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principle, neighbors do have and can claim sufficiency-based interests
in the aesthetic, traditional, or community-oriented aspects of a
nearby building. But those sufficiency claims need to be reconciled
with the other factors relevant to labor—productive use and claimmarking. First, when rights are assigned by a discretionary regulatory
process focusing on subjective aesthetic or community qualities, those
processes create claim-marking problems. In nuisance cases, courts
are generally reluctant to grant relief for complaints about blocked
light on this ground;256 they worry that proprietary rights to light
would make it extremely difficult for landowners to get fair “notice of
limitations on the use of [their] property.”257 Similar concerns apply as
well to landmark schemes.
Separately, boundary-based property rules facilitate the
productive use of land by giving different neighbors equal
opportunities to use their lots for different goals. When property law
focuses on perceptible invasions, it focuses on the disturbances that
hit owners most where they live, and it keeps the criteria for
“noxiousness” and “wrongfulness” fairly apolitical.258 If the law
expands to cover uses that seem ugly, out of place, or objectionable, it
encourages neighbors to complain about nearby land uses they
happen to dislike. Courts intuit this concern in private nuisance cases
about aesthetic nuisances or access to light: “Because every new
construction project is bound to block someone’s view of something,
every landowner would be open to a claim of nuisance.”259 Earlier
inverse condemnation cases worried that residential-only zoning
imposes a “strait-jacket” on development and change in zoned
neighborhoods.260
The public law of landmarking does not need to follow the policy
preferences locked into nuisance cases or now-repudiated inverse
condemnation precedents. But these authorities illustrate possible
downsides to landmarking schemes. Landmark supporters assume

256. See, e.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d
357, 358–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
257. Sher v. Leiderman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698, 704 (Ct. App. 1986).
258. See, e.g., Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 509 P.2d 588, 591 (Colo. 1973) (arguing of
a suit to have a lawful activity declared a public nuisance, “Given our myriad and
disparate tastes, life styles, mores, and attitudes, the availability of judicial remedy for
[aesthetic] complaints would cause inexorable confusion[]”); Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson
Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1411–13 (2010).
259. Mohr v. Midas Realty Corp., 431 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Iowa 1988).
260. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 272
U.S. 365 (1926).
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that landmarks should be designated whenever they create aesthetic,
historic, or community-related social goods.261 Productive labor
theory identifies countervailing goods, namely different citizens’
interests in different active land uses. Citizens will differ in their
preferences as between active land uses and a neighborhood
characterized by more passive uses and a stronger sense of heritage,
aesthetics, and community. Yet landmarking designations favor
passive uses over active ones. In disputes in which all preferences
cannot be satisfied, productive labor theory recommends erring on
the side of facilitating the uses more necessary for basic life goals.262
When authorities pursue landmark policies aggressively anyway,
a classical liberal, rights based political theory makes seem significant
four possible unfortunate consequences. The first is to choke the free
use and development of local property. Fifty years in, New York
City’s Landmarks Preservation Commission now exercises
jurisdiction over 33,000 landmarked buildings and 130 historic
districts throughout the five New York boroughs263—including 27%
of the buildings in Manhattan.264
Second, the landmarking process will probably become
disputatious. Developers and affordable-housing advocates will
agitate for looser designation standards, while preservationists and
“not in my backyard” local residents will agitate for tighter standards.
New York’s experience fits that pattern. In 2014, the city’s
Landmarks Preservation Commission chairwoman proposed to
“decalendar” ninety-three sites on the ground that the Commission
had been considering their preservation applications for decades.265
Most of these applications had languished because they were
controversial, but the chairwoman attracted intense criticism for
261. See The White Plains Historic Preservation Law, CITY OF WHITE PLAINS, www
.cityofwhiteplains.com/DocumentCenter/View/1873 [http://perma.cc/4HWY-CXKT].
262. Early twentieth century regulatory takings disputes about billboard bans framed
the stakes as being about the merits of “aesthetic considerations,” which they described as
“a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity . . . .” City of Passaic v.
Paterson Bill Posting, Advert. & Sign Painting Co., 62 A. 267, 268 (N.J. 1905); see also
Varney & Green v. Williams, 100 P. 867, 868 (Cal. 1909) (quoting Passaic, 62 A. at 267),
overruled by Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 610 P.2d 407 (Cal. 1980); Crawford v.
City of Topeka, 33 P. 476, 477 (Kan. 1893).
263. The Low Down on the NYC Landmarks Law, PERCHWELL, http://blog.perchwell
.com/low-down-on-nyc-landmarks-law [http://perma.cc/8SJC-REUJ].
264. Editorial, New York’s Landmarks Law at 50, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/18/opinion/new-york-citys-landmarks-law-at-50.html?_r=0 [http://
perma.cc/HG69-9AAC (staff-uploaded archive)].
265. Josh Barbanel, New York City Landmarks Panel’s Move Upsets Critics—and
Supporters, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2014, 10:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-yorkcity-landmarks-panels-move-upsets-supportersand-critics-1418182825.
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taking the applications off of the commission’s calendar all the
same.266
In addition, the statutory criteria for landmarking (“special
character,” “interest,” or “value”) are vague.267 That vagueness seems
likely to invite arbitrariness. A current New York preservation
commissioner agrees; in his opinion, commission determinations end
up centering on standards of appropriateness: “[A]ppropriateness” is
“a marvelous word, and it’s unclear what it is . . . . It boils down to
whatever the commissioners say it is on any given Tuesday.”268 Those
same standards may also invite censoriousness, a tendency by some
political and community leaders to claim authority to pronounce the
tastes that ought to be the community’s. When the Penn Central
Company tried to negotiate regulatory waivers for its proposed
renovation of Grand Central Station, a landmarks commission
member recommended rejecting its proposal because the proposed
remodeling would have been “nothing more than an aesthetic
joke.”269
Finally, when the free use of property is constrained, the
distribution of and access to property may become more regressive.
Because landmark designations restrict new development, access to
these communities is generally limited to relatively wealthy citizens.270
Further, because landmark processes are complex and arcane, wellconnected elites enjoy disproportionate influence in shaping how
landmarking criteria are applied.271 Other prospective residents are
likely to be excluded—especially outsiders, poorer residents, and
members of races or ethnic groups not well connected to city elites.272
The aftermath of New York’s landmarking has confirmed this
concern as well. On average, the residents of historic districts in
Manhattan are twice as wealthy ($123,000 versus $63,000) and less
266. Id.
267. N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 25-302(n) (2015).
268. Emily Nonko, You Say Tomato: How the Landmarks Preservation Commission
Approves Modern Design, OBSERVER (June 23, 2015, 7:35 PM), http://observer.com/2015
/06/you-say-tomato-how-the-landmarks-preservation-commission-approves-modern-design/
[http://perma.cc/H6DF-7VEK].
269. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 118 (1978).
270. See Less Housing Production, Racial Diversity in Historic Districts, THE REAL
DEAL (Apr. 20, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://therealdeal.com/blog/2015/04/20/less-housingproduction-racial-diversity-in-nycs-historic-districts/ [http://perma.cc/G895-EZAE].
271. See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST
INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER 149
(2011).
272. See Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 312–13, 316 (N.D. Ohio
1924), rev’d, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

95 N.C. L. REV. 413 (2017)

2017]

LABOR, EXCLUSION, AND FLOURISHING

469

than half as racially diverse as the residents of non-landmark areas.273
Of the 206,000 units of housing built in New York City from 2003 to
2012, only 100 (0.29%) were both affordable and built within
landmarked buildings or districts.274
Leading defenses of landmark schemes praise landmark laws as
an example of a real-life institution refuting a “classical liberal
approach [in which regulatory power] is limited to the negative
obligation . . . to avoid committing nuisance.”275 Yet productive labor
theory does not regard property as a right to do anything short of
inflicting harms on one’s neighbors. Rights are structured negatively
for the most part because such rights indirectly do a better job of
securing citizens’ affirmative interests in flourishing. Negative rights
are simpler, clearer, more consistent with the rule of law, and less
likely to be tested by ideologues or exploited by moneyed influences
to the detriment of less influential citizens.276
Separately, although beauty, historic character, and common
culture can all generate sufficiency claims and contribute to the
common good, they’re not the most basic parts of the common good.
The common good consists in the first instance of a community
understood as a partnership that facilitates individual partners
pursuing their own needs and goals.277 If a community really thinks
that some particular piece of property will enhance the satisfaction of
all citizens, for aesthetic or other refined reasons, it may freeze future
use of that property. Yet the community should recognize that its
landmarking designations interfere with more fundamental
obligations to provide equal opportunities to people to pursue their
own goals. The best ways to recognize these dangers are to structure
landmark designations as takings of servitudes that ordinarily inhere
in private ownership, and to use this eminent domain power only for
the vistas and buildings most essential to forming a strong sense of
local community.

273. See Less Housing Production, Racial Diversity in Historic Districts, supra note 270.
274. Press Release, REBNY Study Concludes Landmark Districts Create Barriers to
Housing Production Throughout the Five Boroughs, REBNY (June 1, 2014), https://www
.rebny.com//content/rebny/en/newsroom/press-releases/2014/REBNY_Study_Concludes
_Landmark_Districts_Create_Barriers_Housing_Production_NYC.html [http://perma.cc
/S7GA-XBNG]; accord GLAESER, supra note 271, at 148–52 (discussing landmark
districts inhibiting building additional housing in New York City and the effect of that
stagnation on the housing prices throughout the area).
275. Alexander, supra note 67, at 753.
276. See Radin, supra note 82, at 1898–903; Wenar, supra note 81.
277. See supra Section V.B.
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D. Land Assembly and Eminent Domain
The most vivid contrasts between natural rights-based and
perfectionist approaches to property regulation arise in land assembly
disputes. “Land assembly” is the term used here to refer to
development practices, under state and local law, authorizing the
condemnation of private land and reassigning it to commercial
developers to build higher-end residential units or new commercial
units.278 State enabling statutes authorize land assembly under one or
both of two main approaches. Blight powers authorize localities to
condemn private land and transfer it to private redevelopers if the
land is “substandard,” “blighted,” or “deteriorating.”279 The U.S.
Supreme Court rejected constitutional challenges to blight programs
in the 1954 decision Berman v. Parker.280 “Economic development”
powers authorize localities to exercise the same powers on a different
showing: the condemnation and redevelopment is needed to improve
local “economic welfare” through “the continued growth of industry
and business.”281 The Court upheld economic development-based
programs against constitutional challenge in the 2005 decision Kelo v.
City of New London.282
Land assembly programs illustrate how plurality, social
obligations, and interest balancing can destabilize property rights. To
be clear, support for land assembly practices is not a necessary or
constitutive element of progressive property. A Statement of
Progressive Property does not specifically praise land assembly.283
Although some progressive scholarship is resignedly accepting of land
assembly,284 more is ambivalent toward285 or sharply critical of286 the
institution.
278. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & Michael Heller, Land Assembly Districts, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1467–69 (2008).
279. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-141 (2015).
280. 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954).
281. § 8-186. For other relevant portions of the statute, see §§ 8-187 to -189, -193.
282. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). I co-authored an amicus curiae
brief against the position adopted by the Court in Kelo and for a position largely like that
advocated by Justice Thomas. See Brief for Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 4, Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2802971.
283. See Alexander et al., supra note 6, at 743–44.
284. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 205, at xix–xxi.
285. See Alexander, supra note 67, at 781 (doubting whether the benefits from a
redevelopment project contribute significantly enough to human flourishing to justify “an
owner sacrific[ing] her property entitlement”); Joseph William Singer, The Ownership
Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 315–16 (2006) (portraying redevelopment condemnations as raising
difficult choices between “castle” and “investment” understandings of property).
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Nevertheless, A Statement of Progressive Property does insist
that property rights need to be connected “to the underlying human
values that property serves,” that these “[v]alues can generate moral
demands and obligations,” and that “[c]hoices about property
entitlements are unavoidable.”287 In land assembly disputes, tenets
like these encourage a train of reasoning: owner property rights need
to be connected to social interests in having a vibrant community; the
community will generate growth or a unified aesthetic environment if
it remakes a neighborhood; and private owners owe a civic
responsibility to sacrifice their lots for growth or common aesthetic
interests.288 This argument surfaces quite regularly in the practice of
land assembly. In Berman, the Supreme Court described the land
owners’ property rights as being subordinate to what it described as a
“broad and inclusive” “concept of the public welfare,” and gave the
legislature leeway to decide that “the community [would] be beautiful
as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled.”289 This same argument structure recurs in
contemporary debates about land assembly after Kelo. For supporters
of economic development condemnations, “[t]here is . . . a ‘greater
good’ to be served” by programs like the Fort Trumbull program
challenged in Kelo, “and some citizens should be willing to make a
sacrifice if they are fairly compensated.”290
Although the debate over land assembly and Kelo cannot be
settled or even treated exhaustively in this Article,291 two points
matter here. First, Kelo was one of the most notorious property

286. See Peñalver, supra note 68, at 863 (citing Kelo as an example of economic
analysis’s “troubling willingness to trade on the well-being of individuals in pursuit of
increased aggregate measures of well-being”); Laura S. Underkuffler, Kelo’s Moral
Failure, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 377, 383 (2006).
287. Alexander et al., supra note 6, at 743–44.
288. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
289. Id.
290. Stan DeCoster, The Battle of Eminent Domain, CONN. C. MAG., http://www
.conncoll.edu/camelweb/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications&circuit=cconline&function=view
&uid=21&id=419821961 [https://perma.cc/XLK3-5RHJ].
291. For accounts sympathetic to the use of eminent domain, see HELLER, supra note
44, at 113–17 (noting serious issues with both voluntary assembly and eminent domain and
asserting that Kelo was correctly decided as a matter of constitutional law); George
Lefcoe, Jeff Benedict’s Little Pink House: The Back Story of the Kelo Case, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 925, 942–44 (2010) (book review) (noting advantages for property owners from
eminent domain buyouts and the overall mobility of the American people); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Goods, the Bads, and the Ugly, LEGAL AFF., http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues
/January-February-2005/toa_merrill_janfeb05.msp [http://perma.cc/MQ9W-25HD] (noting
that “at key points in our history, forced transfers of property have been perceived to be
the best solution to particular social problems”).
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lawsuit of the last forty years. Shortly after Kelo was handed down,
the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning it
by a 365 to 33 vote, opinion surveys three months later reported that
between 80% and 95% of respondents were critical of the decision,
and forty-three states enacted reform statutes responding to its
holding.292 Productive labor theory gives a powerful account why the
citizens outraged by Kelo293 might be expressing good Lockean
property and political instincts. Second, productive labor theory
expresses well the concerns that make Kelo so problematic—concerns
about perfectionism in land use policy.
Most simply, productive labor theory supplies a starting
presumption: if an owner is making some non-trivial, beneficial use of
the relevant lot, it should not be condemned and reassigned for
development by another private actor without a clear and convincing
reason. This presumption is neither final nor irreversible. One can see
as much in nineteenth and early-twentieth century cases skeptical of
the expansion of eminent domain.294 Such cases construed the “public
use” requirement narrowly to authorize only the government or
common carriers to use condemned property.295 Yet some such cases
also construed constitutional police power limitations to authorize
some condemnations and private redistributions—say, for laws
authorizing irrigation projects in arid territories,296 or authorizing the
transfer of riparian land to an applicant who wanted to build a power
mill.297 In situations like these, the proposed project promised to
generate significant public benefits and condemnation was
unavoidable in a relatively strict sense because the benefits could not
be realized unless most or all plots of land were integrated into the
project.298
292. See H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. H5592–93 (2005); Ilya Somin,
The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100,
2102, 2109–11 & n.45 (2009) (Zogby Int’l, American Farm Bureau Federation Survey 27
question 28 (Nov. 2, 2005); Ctr. for Econ. & Civic Opinion at Univ. of Mass./Lowell, The
Saint Index Poll question 9 (2007)) (examining state legislative responses).
293. See text accompanying infra note 313.
294. See ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON & THE
LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 35–72 (2015); Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and
Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 919–28 (2004); see also RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 170–75
(1986).
295. See, e.g., Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 341–42 (1877); SOMIN, supra note 294,
at 35–72.
296. See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896).
297. See, e.g., Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 20–21 (1885); see Claeys, supra
note 294, at 919–28; EPSTEIN, supra note 294, at 170–75.
298. See Claeys, supra note 294, at 906–09.
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These earlier cases construed “public use” and police power
principles strictly because they started with the presumption stressed
in Parts II and III: if someone is deploying a resource to some nontrivial life-benefitting use, in most situations the best way to promote
community flourishing is to protect that use.299 That presumption
explains the opposition to land assembly and also that opposition’s
intensity. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor expressed Lockean
sentiments in the best-known passage of her dissent in Kelo: “Who
among us can say she already makes the most productive or attractive
possible use of her property? . . . Nothing is to prevent the State from
replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping
mall, or any farm with a factory.”300
That presumption also informed other and earlier classical liberal
judicial opinions protesting the abuse of eminent domain. Lest we
forget, the Supreme Court considered Berman because the
authorizing statute challenged in that case had been narrowly
construed by a three-judge district court to avoid possible
constitutional problems.301 Regardless of what one thinks of the
doctrinal merits of the lower court’s argument, the court anticipated
the natural rights themes discussed in this Section. The court
supposed for the sake of argument that the condemned
neighborhood:
fails to meet what are called modern standards. . . . Suppose its
owners and occupants like it that way. Suppose they are oldfashioned, prefer single-family dwellings, like small flower
gardens, believe that a plot of ground is the place to rear
children, prefer fresh to conditioned air, sun to fluorescent
light. . . . Is a modern apartment house a better breeder of men
than is the detached or row house? . . . Are such questions as
these to be decided by the Government? And, if the decisions
be adverse to the erstwhile owners and occupants, is their entire
right to own the property thereby destroyed?302
This presumption is justified by several implicitly empirical
background assumptions. As Section VI.A explained, one is a strong
skepticism that centralized regulation with planning will succeed
often enough to make the game worth the candle. Whether land
assembly does succeed often enough is an empirical matter, and there
299. See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 158; Head, 113 U.S. at 20–21.
300. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
301. See Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 724–25 (D.D.C. 1953),
modified sub nom. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954).
302. See id. at 719.
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is little directly relevant information.303 The project in Kelo provides
at least one vivid case study confirming that land assembly can
backfire. Four years after the Supreme Court removed the last
judicial obstacle to New London’s project, the developer set to
receive the property in dispute had failed to receive financing.304 It
took New London another six years to start this new project on the
site.305
Another background concern is that economic development
powers attract special interest pressures. In New London, the Pfizer
plan first arose because the chairwoman of the New London
Development Corporation (the “NLDC”) was married to a Pfizer
executive and used his contacts to identify and recruit another Pfizer
executive to the NLDC’s board.306 The NLDC exempted from
condemnation and redevelopment the Italian Dramatic Club, a
private social club popular with local politicians.307
Productive labor theory also incorporates a concern that, when
government actors get to determine the highest and best uses of
property, their decisions will get caught up in conflicts between
different ways of life. Kelo struck a nerve partly because it captured
this aspect of land assembly policy. As one former Connecticut state
official explained of the Fort Trumbull project, Pfizer officials “were

303. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property and Politics, NEW RAMBLER (Sept. 28, 2015),
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/property-and-politics [https://perma.cc/CQP87DRX] (reviewing SOMIN, supra note 294). There is fine empirical work on compensation
practices, see, for example, Yun-Chien Chang, An Empirical Study of Compensation Paid
in Eminent Domain Settlements: New York City 1990–2002, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 203–04
(2010). For a case studying and at least one case study on how private actors circumvent
eminent domain, see, for example, Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in
Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2006). But it is more difficult to test, and there are few (if any)
works trying directly to test, whether particular redevelopment projects generate net
benefits, and the same goes for tests about whether eminent domain and redevelopment
policies in particular states generate net benefits for all land uses and projects affected by
them. For one of the few counterexamples attempting to grapple with these broader
issues, see Stephen J.K. Walters & Louis Miserendino, Baltimore’s Flawed Renaissance:
The Failure of Plan-Control-Subsidize Redevelopment, PERSP. ON EMINENT DOMAIN
ABUSE, June 2008, at 3–4.
304. See Katie Nelson, Fort Trumbull Still Vacant 4 Years After Seizure, NEW HAVEN
REG. (Sept. 25, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20090925/forttrumbull-still-vacant-4-years-after-seizure [https://perma.cc/8YUX-GZL3].
305. See Colin A. Young, RCDA Sends Proposal for Fort Trumbull Development to
City Council, THE DAY (Mar. 25, 2015, 6:50 PM), http://www.theday.com/article/20150324
/NWS01/150329885 [https://perma.cc/H2DW-XRFH].
306. See JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE: A TRUE STORY OF DEFIANCE AND
COURAGE 24, 27 (2009).
307. See id. at 65–66, 175.
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trying to attract people with Ph.Ds. who make $150,000 to $200,000 a
year to eastern Connecticut . . . and they were not going to tell them
they had to drive to work through a blighted community.”308
Ultimately, “The idea that she wasn’t worthy of living next door to
Pfizer left Susette [Kelo] feeling scorned and slighted too. ‘Rich white
people don’t like us,’ she said.”309
VII. LABOR AND THE MORAL VALUE OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY
The last Part showed how productive labor theory anticipates
and avoids the tendencies that make flourishing a troublesome
grounding for property rights. Yet one may reasonably wonder
whether it is necessary to justify property in relation to flourishing at
all. Economic analyses can and have purported to justify property
understood as a robust right to exclude. There are fine economic
analyses evaluating trespass,310 adverse possession,311 landmarking
schemes,312 eminent domain,313 and even roaming statutes314 with
judgments similar to the judgments offered in this Article.315
A. Efficiency and Legitimate Authority
Yet it has not been proven satisfactorily that economic efficiency
is a quality relevant to instituting property laws. In property
scholarship, some law and economics scholars have addressed this
issue; productive labor theory complements their works by filling in a

308. See Ted Mann, Pfizer’s Fingerprints on Fort Trumbull Plan, THE DAY, Oct. 16,
2005, 12:01 AM, http://www.theday.com/article/20051016/BIZ04/911119999 [https://perma
.cc/AV4W-4SKK].
309. BENEDICT, supra note 306, at 102.
310. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of
Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985) (applying an economic model
to defend the strict liability nature of trespass).
311. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse
Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1137–45 (1984).
312. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 28, at 981–82; Richard A. Epstein, The Problem with
NYC’s Landmark Preservation Laws, HOOVER INSTITUTION: DEFINING IDEAS (Apr. 20,
2015), http://www.hoover.org/research/problem-nycs-landmark-preservation-laws [https://
perma.cc/3HDJ-Q3MX].
313. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 2111–20; Kelly, supra note 303, at 5. See
generally Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings
After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183 (2007) (reconsidering Kelo and deference to local
governments in light of eminent domain abuse and the shortfalls of economic
development takings).
314. See Klick & Parchomovsky, supra note 243, at 23–34; Henry E. Smith, Property Is
Not Just a Bundle of Rights, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 279, 283–84 (2011).
315. See Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 6–
9 (1990).
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theory of justice roughly of the character assumed in their works.316
As we shall see, however, some law and economic analyses of
property assume that economic analysis can justify exclusion without
addressing how efficiency relates to legal legitimacy.317 Productive
labor theory highlights philosophical challenges overlooked by those
works. Last, some leading justifications for economic analysis assert
that it can justify legal rules without recourse to a theory of justice.318
Productive labor theory (like a Lockean theory of politics generally)
provides further confirmation that these justifications suffer from
important legitimacy problems.
In a theory of justice and rights, any normative account of law is
defective and incomplete unless it addresses the problem of legitimate
authority. As Frank Michelman explains, every law needs a “moral
warrant for the application of collective force in support of laws
produced by nonconsensual means, against individual members of a
population of presumptively free and equal persons.”319 In moral
terms, people are capable of reasoning about their own well-beings
and choosing particular forms of well-being they find satisfying, and
other things being equal their choices deserve respect. As a result, as
a moral matter, any legal rule that stops a person from pursuing his
own legitimate project for well-being seems presumptively to
interfere with his freedom. The rule may be justified. An owner may
be required to sacrifice property to pay his fair share of taxes, to
compensate someone else for having violated her rights previously, or
to contribute a resource the public needs vitally for a public use. Yet
the justifications for taxes, corrective justice, or eminent domain
connect the sacrifice to a reasoned argument. On one hand, the
argument must explain why the owner’s rights need to be qualified in
relation to the common good; on the other hand, the argument must
explain (like the deontological constraints discussed above in Part V)
why the common good incorporates a decent respect for the interests
of the owner.
This demand creates a challenge for economic justifications for
legal rules.320 If “the term ‘efficiency’ . . . denote[s] that allocation of
316. See infra Section VII.E.
317. See infra Sections VII.C.
318. See infra Section VII.B.
319. Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political
Justification, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 13, 22–23 (2003).
320. The text focuses on the most important moral challenge to efficiency-based
justifications for law, but not the only one. Before transaction cost bargaining analysis is
used to project the best use of a resource, it needs to be shown that the resource is a fit
subject for bargaining (unlike, say, the acquisition of body parts, or access to rights of
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resources in which value is maximized[,]”321 why does the “value” that
is maximized confer legitimate authority? As Jules Coleman explains,
To look at the law as the economist sometimes implores us to
do, from the point of view of behavior, and not reasons [that
give law legitimate authority], is not to understand the law at
all. For what is distinctive of law is that it regulates our affairs
by offering reasons for acting that are coercively enforceable.322
This legitimacy challenge may be met in one of two main ways.
One is to argue that economic efficiency justifies certain legal rules
irrespective of its relation to justice; the other is to accept that
efficiency analysis can become normative if supplemented by
“additional premises” about justice and rights.323 Several prominent
exclusion theories embrace the latter strategy.324 Yet general
justifications for economic analysis pursue the former strategy,325 and
some economic defenses of exclusion avoid engaging the relevant
philosophical issues.326 As a result, the next two sections recount the
reasons why economic efficiency might not have the value necessary
to justify property to explain why there are problems worth
addressing, and how productive labor theory can help address them.

sexual congress). If the parties start bargaining with any resources or wealth, it needs to be
shown why those distributions are just enough for bargaining to commence. One also
needs to determine what the “resource” is and with what legal rights and responsibilities
its res is composed of before any bargaining begins. See Michelman, supra note 5, at 32–34.
If the analysis suggests that rights may be shifted because they are efficient according to
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, that criterion assumes normative premises that may be
debatable and may not be applicable across all act-disputes. See FLETCHER, supra note 42,
at 158–68.
321. POSNER, supra note 42, § 1.2, at 16.
322. Jules L. Coleman, Some Reflections on Richard Brooks’s “Efficient Performance
Hypothesis”, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 416, 421–22 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org
/forum/some-reflections-on-richard-brookss-efficient-performance-hypothesis [https://perma
.cc/A76U-4Y3F].
323. KLAUS MATHIS, EFFICIENCY INSTEAD OF JUSTICE? SEARCHING FOR THE
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 33, 38–39
(Deborah Shannon trans., 2009); Michelman, supra note 5, at 31.
324. See infra Section VII.E.
325. Although this Article focuses primarily on Richard Posner’s normative
justifications for efficiency analysis, see POSNER, supra note 42, §§ 2.1–.2, at 29–33, a
similar critique could be made of LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE 3–4 (2002) (arguing that “legal rules should be selected entirely with
respect to their effects of well-being of individuals in society”).
326. See infra Section IV.C.
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The Normative Value of Efficiency

Richard Posner deserves pride of place for his efforts to justify
economic analysis normatively. Although Posner has proposed three
possible justifications, each has difficulties. The first possible
justification is that economic analysis helps maximize social value, as
understood in classical forms of utilitarianism.327 Such forms of
utilitarianism are problematic, however, because they assume that
“utility” refers to “pleasure” or “preference” in hedonistic and
subjective senses.328 When utility is described in terms of hedonistic
and subjective preferences, it seems determinate. Yet that portrait
also makes utility problematic. Subjectivism and hedonism legitimate
the preferences of sadists, racists, tyrants, and other vicious people.329
Separately, although it is never easy, in any ethics, to make any one
person’s preferences commensurable with others’ preferences,
incommensurability problems can be more severe when each person’s
preferences are subjective and incapable of being valued by others.
The problems that make utility incommensurable across individuals
make it even harder to aggregate individual preferences into one
social utility profile. Efforts to do so reduce individuals to being “cells
in the overall social organism rather than . . . individuals.”330
Alternately, the value being maximized in efficiency could be
social wealth.331 Yet wealth maximization is problematic as well.
Wealth is not a sufficient condition for moral well being; some people

327. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 11–16 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., University of London
1970) (1789); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 55 (Roger Crisp ed., 1998) (1861);
HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 411–17 (1874); see also J.J.C. Smart, An
Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3, 9–12
(J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973) (defending “act-utilitarianism” and its
singular goal of maximizing “probable benefit”); Julia Driver, The History of
Utilitarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014), http://plato
.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/utilitarianism-history/ [https://perma.cc/DZG6-JEBE].
328. Driver, supra note 327 (“The Classical Utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and John
Stuart Mill, identified the good with pleasure, so, like Epicurus, were hedonists about
value.”).
329. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 10, ch. 3, at 1173 (C.D.C. Reeve trans.,
Hackett Publ’g, Co. 2014).
330. POSNER, supra note 42, § 1.2, at 16–17. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed
Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1197 (1997) (discussing the frequent failures of economic models of utility to
successfully predict real human behavior); Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,
in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST, supra note 327, at 81–82 (sketching a general
critique of traditional utilitarianism).
331. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 494 (1990).
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are more miserable after winning lotteries than they were before. Nor
is wealth a necessary condition; some people manage to prosper
without significant material wealth. In law,
the wealth maximization standard . . . is (at least in its
immediate applications) apparently biased in favor of the
wealthy, is oblivious to questions of distributive justice, and in
general disregards all human valuations or motivations that are
not responsive to considerations of price, or cost, in a sense
approximately measurable by methods available to economic
science.332
One last possibility consists of a combination of Pareto
superiority and consent.333 Transactions are Kaldor-Hicks efficient if
the social gains from the transactions exceed their social losses;
transactions are Pareto superior if they generate social gains without
making anyone worse off.334 Because Pareto superior transitions do
not diminish the utility positions of any affected stakeholders, Posner
suggested, it would be just to infer that stakeholders do not object to
such transitions—and then to presume that they have consented to
those transitions.335 Yet this justification raises problems as well. As
Posner himself acknowledges, “the conditions for Pareto superiority
are almost never satisfied in the real world,” because most legal
transitions do worsen some individuals’ positions.336 Furthermore,
even when Pareto superior criteria are satisfied, Posner’s argument
leverages a positive statement about preferences into a normative
claim: that preferences deserve respect even if the preferences seem
destructive or antisocial. Pareto superiority does not necessarily
describe a normatively attractive quality, Jules Coleman concludes,
because “people sometimes choose to do what they do not prefer to
do, and do not do what they would otherwise prefer to do, often
because they think it wrong to act as they would otherwise prefer.”337
332. Frank I. Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 307, 311 (1979); see also RADIN, supra note 207, at 1–29; Anthony
Kronman, Wealth Maximization As a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 228–29
(1980). See generally Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980)
(discussing the ways in which economic models often ignore important human motivators
beyond wealth).
333. Posner, supra note 331, at 490.
334. See id. at 488, 491.
335. See id. at 488–97.
336. POSNER, supra note 42, at 18. See Posner, supra note 331, at 495 (describing
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as an administrable substitute for Pareto superiority).
337. Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 1519 (2003)
(reviewing KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 325); see also Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency,
Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980).
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The Normative Value of Efficiency in Property
1. Exclusive Property

The problems recounted in Section V.B. can trouble economic
analyses of property laws unless such analyses are qualified carefully.
For example, some works justify exclusion by comparing the pros and
cons of open-access regimes and exclusive property.338 In such works,
exclusion seems desirable because the wealth created by encouraging
investment, reaping, and sowing outweighs the costs of administering
exclusive rights.339 This justification assumes that a property regime
can be justified by the wealth it creates. Yet that assumption raises
the question of why some people’s enrichment, or the whole
community’s aggregate enrichment, can justify a legal regime
restricting others from access to resources they might want to enjoy.340
Some works justify exclusive ownership on the grounds that it
protects owner subjective value341 and minimizes the information
costs that non-owners need to expend to process property rights.342
Without additional premises, these justifications raise the problems
associated with classical forms of utilitarianism and Posner’s Pareto
superiority-consent argument. People’s desires toward property can
vary widely and clash sharply. Those variations and clashes make it
hard to reconcile different “subjective valuations” on different
resources, or to reconcile such valuations with social costs like
information costs.
Although critics of economic analysis sometimes cite the
preferences of racists and sadists to illustrate these arguments,343
those illustrations may not be the most revealing examples. In any
community, some people can attach to property preferences that are,
on one hand, not vicious but understandable and still, on the other
hand, extremely difficult to reconcile with the preferences of other
citizens. Some aboriginal communities object strongly to regimes of
individual exclusive ownership of freely alienable lots on the ground
that the land held by their communities is “imbued with spiritual
338. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 55, at 2081–93.
339. See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 4, at 354–59.
340. See Peñalver, supra note 68, at 827 (discussing how economic analysis provides
little guidance in determining what the goals of property law should be).
341. See, e.g., SOMIN, supra note 294, at 190–92; Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of
Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 82–85 (1986).
342. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 385–88.
343. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 21, at 916–18 (“If utility is premised on both autonomy
and equality, then perhaps we do not count the interests of racists in determining whether
a law prohibiting intentional discrimination in housing is good.”).
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meaning[,] . . . constitutive of the identity of the people who live []on
it[,]” and not only “given to them to live upon, but also given to past
and future generations.”344 That understanding of land use and
ownership inspired at least some of the Native American opposition
to white European-American settlement of the Western frontier over
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.345 Other citizens may
have strong religious or ideological commitments to living in strong
communities. In his 1993 article Property in Land, Ellickson
assembled sociological scholarship showing why Protestant
Hutterites, Israeli kibbutzniks, and Woodstock youth all preferred
communal arrangements.346 Other citizens may be paternalists.347 Such
citizens take satisfaction not from living in communal or open-access
regimes themselves but from seeing their fellow citizens change their
preferences to want to live in such regimes.348
These three preference sets—for aboriginal ways of life, for
intensely held anti-romantic or communitarian preferences, and for
paternalist property policies—conflict sharply with the preferences of
citizens who have more practical tastes. A system of private property
needs a better argument to justify disregarding such preferences, and
this argument needs to have legitimate authority sufficient to justify
protecting private property with government force.
2. Land Assembly Powers and Other Limits on Exclusive Property
Similar problems arise in law and economic treatments of the
regulatory systems that supply exceptions to private property.
Consider the law and economic scholarship on land assembly.349 In
standard portraits, land assembly issues present a tradeoff. In some
situations, a community may generate great social gains if many
smaller tracts of land are reassembled into one large-scale project.
Lots should be reassembled if the main obstacle to reassembly
consists of owners holding out to expropriate the social gains.
Reassembly should not take place if the parties favoring it seem likely
344. Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of
Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1601 (2001).
345. See WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE
ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 54–81 (1983).
346. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 1346–62.
347. See Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152,
152–55 (1970).
348. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 1317 & n.2 (attributing this view to Karl Marx &
Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS 221,
237 (David McLellan ed., 1977)).
349. On assembly and its context, see supra notes 278–82 and accompanying text.
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to expropriate owner subjective value, if the government process for
administering reassembly seems likely to generate secondary rentseeking and other short-term administrative costs, or if it seems likely
to generate long-term costs by undermining private markets for
reassembly.350
Unless such analyses are qualified by moral premises, they
conceal problems similar to the ones recounted in the last subsection.
True, there may be some affected owners who are acting solely from a
desire to extract as much wealth from developers as they can, and
there may be some developers who enjoy dispossessing landowners as
much as Steenberg Homes’s assistant manager enjoyed trespassing
across the Jacques’ lot.351 In many and probably most cases, however,
“holding out” and “subjective value expropriation” do not convey
adequately the strength or the complexity of both sides’ claims. In
practice, both terms seem to be used in ways that assume latent moral
premises.
We can illustrate adequately here with the motivations and
arguments of the supporters and opponents of the project that
launched the Kelo lawsuit. The best-connected insiders were
committed not only to increasing New London’s aggregate wealth but
also to changing the city’s way of life.352 These insiders thought New
London was decrepit, and that a new pharmaceutical plant and an
influx of urban professionals would put the city on the map.353 The
president of the NLDC brought a missionary zeal to the project; she
described her inspiration to launch New London’s development
program as being “like the hand of God in my life.”354 On the other
side, many of Fort Trumbull’s residents were elderly and wanted to
be spared the hardship of being moved from their homes.355
Neighborhood resident Billy Von Winkle had spent two decades
“turn[ing] some of the neighborhood’s most blighted structures into
quality, affordable housing”; he thought he deserved no less than
350. See, e.g., HELLER, supra note 44, at 108–17; SOMIN, supra note 294, at 74–99;
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 44, at 1106–08; Daniel B. Kelly, Acquiring Land
Through Eminent Domain: Justifications, Limitations, and Alternatives, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 344, 344–64 (Kenneth Ayotte &
Henry E. Smith eds., 2011); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, The Economics of
Eminent Domain: Private Property, Public Use, and Just Compensation, 3 FOUND. &
TRENDS MICROECONOMICS 275, 291–96 (2007).
351. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W. 2d 154, 157 ¶¶ 7–8 (Wis. 1997).
352. See supra Section VI.D.
353. BENEDICT, supra note 306, at 38–54, 100–02.
354. Id. at 18–23.
355. Wilhelmina Dery received the most attention in this respect; she was in her late
eighties and wanted to die in her own home. See id. at 88.
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$700,000 for his work, and he became incensed when he decided that
pro-assembly actors were using eminent domain to undercut his
bargaining position.356 Suzette Kelo did not want to move out of her
neighborhood under any circumstances, and she took offense at what
she perceived as a group of “[r]ich white people” trying to take over
her neighborhood so that incoming professionals could have
residences with a nice view.357 Furthermore, onlookers—faculty at
Connecticut College in particular—opposed the Fort Trumbull part
of the project because they thought that the neighborhood had
distinct architecture, and that it was unjust to use eminent domain to
clear the neighborhood.358
When disputants have perceptions and desires like these, it is
difficult to make economic cases for land assembly by appealing
solely to efficiency. Assume that leaders approve an assembly like the
project litigated in Kelo on the ground that it seems likely to create
net wealth in New London. When leaders make such a decision, they
assume that wealth creation takes priority over elderly residents’
interests in peace and quiet, Van Winkle and other improving owners’
claims to just returns for their investments, the demands of Kelo and
residents like her not to be treated condescendingly, and the interests
of onlookers like Connecticut College faculty in seeing justice. Pareto
superiority and implied consent do not eliminate these problems.
None of the individuals just mentioned explicitly consented to the
New London project, and when it disregarded their objections, the
NLDC went forward with a Pareto inferior project. If some
aggregative and classical form of utilitarianism grounds the
justification for land assembly, that grounding will not be satisfying
either. The preferences of elderly residents, Van Winkle, Kelo, and
Connecticut College faculty seem difficult to reconcile with a putative
social interest in putting New London on the map or increasing jobs,
wealth, and the tax base.
D. A Lockean Critique of Efficiency
As the last two sections have shown, over the last generation
legal scholars have raised serious challenges to arguments, by Posner
and others, that efficiency has normative value standing alone.359 All
of these critiques were anticipated by Locke. Consider first the

356.
357.
358.
359.

See id. at 36–37, 62, 101–02.
See id. at 65, 67–69, 102.
See id. at 123–28.
See supra Section VII.B–.C.
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problems associated with classical forms of utilitarianism. Although
Locke wrote his Two Treatises a century or two before Bentham, Mill,
and Sidgwick, he says enough to anticipate preference
utilitarianism.360 He is fully aware of the problem of vicious utility
preferences; a major concern of his Two Treatises is the possibility
that the human imagination, fanatic tendencies, and dogmatic
tendencies may “carry [man] to a Brutality below the level of
Beasts.”361 One of the main points of Locke’s political theory is to
distinguish between the states of character associated with the
“Industrious and Rational” and those associated with the
“Quarrelsom and Contentious.”362 In other words, even if people are
motivated by their desires and their perceptions of pleasure and pain,
those desires and perceptions do not enjoy normative status if they go
beyond what is sufficient for rational and sociable forms of
happiness.363
Locke also anticipates the main objections to wealthmaximization. Locke agrees that wealth lacks normative value on its
own “as to Money, and . . . Riches and Treasure,” he warns, “these
are none of Natures Goods, they have but a Phantastical imaginary
value: Nature has put no such upon them.”364 For Locke, people
usually desire money and precious resources for one of three reasons:
greed,365 desire for conventional status,366 or to acquire the means by
which to satisfy survival and improvement-related needs.367 If
flourishing is the theoretical goal, of these three, only the last is
legitimate.
Finally, Locke anticipates problems with making consent a basis
for obligation. This suggestion may strike readers as surprising,

360. See BUCKLE, supra note 13, at 146; SIMMONS, supra note 86, at 56–58. Buckle
provides further confirmation from Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
See BUCKLE, supra note 13, at 142–45 (citing Locke, supra note 8, § 2.6, at 271).
361. LOCKE, supra note 8, § I.58, at 182.
362. Id. § II.34, at 291.
363. Id. (“He that had as good left for his Improvement, as was already taken up,
needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another’s
Labour: If he did, ‘tis plain he desired the benefit of another’s Pains, which he had no right
to . . . .”).
364. Id. § II.184, at 391.
365. Id. §§ II.37, II.111, at 294, 342 (respectively) (describing greed in terms of “amor
sceleratus habendi, evil Concupiscence,” and a “desire of having more than Men need[]”).
366. See id. § II.46, at 299–300 (noting that some goods are not desired because of their
utility, but because “Fancy or Agreement hath put the Value on [them]”).
367. See id. § II.47, at 300–01 (describing money as a “lasting thing that . . . Men would
take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable Supports of Life”).
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because Locke is frequently portrayed as a social contract theorist.368
Locke does hold that individuals should not be subjected to the
authority of a government unless they have consented to be governed
under its jurisdiction.369 Yet once citizens have provided this general
consent, it does not follow that they cannot be bound to follow
specific substantive regulations unless they consent to those
regulations as well. Indeed, Locke takes pains to repudiate consentbased theories of property. Locke argues against consent-based
theories, and for labor-based theories, because people might withhold
consent unreasonably and cause their neighbors to “starve[].”370 So
legal officials may institute labor-securing regulations, assuming that a
just and rational citizenry has already acquiesced in a “tacit and
voluntary consent” to such regulations.371
E.

A Lockean Rehabilitation of Efficiency

Not only does Locke anticipate familiar problems with efficiency
analysis, he also supplies a better possible grounding for such analysis.
Again, Michelman noted that “a careful reader” of economic analysis
“can always infer additional premises” about human behavior and
sociability “implicit in the literature’s accounts of the efficiency
virtues of private property.”372 Among other possible premises,
Michelman suggested the following: people do value freedom and
should be treated as owners of their own persons and agency, and
people deserve enough access to their community’s resources that
they can pursue concurrently their own individual life goals.373 These
sound like Lockean premises.374 For law and economic scholars open
to the possibility, productive labor theory supplies moral context,
making economic analysis of property rights more defensible.
Indeed, some law and economic scholars are open to this
possibility. Let me illustrate with three examples, starting first with
368. See, e.g., Celeste Friend, Social Contract Theory, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/ [https://perma.cc/YQK5-FC2E].
369. See Charles R. Beitz, Tacit Consent and Property Rights, 8 POL. THEORY 487, 487
(1980); A. John Simmons, Tacit Consent and Political Obligation, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 274,
274 (1976); Alex Tuckness, Locke’s Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/ [https://
perma.cc/TXM7-LZ6V].
370. See LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.28, at 288.
371. See id. § II.50, at 301–02.
372. Michelman, supra note 5, at 32.
373. See id. at 33.
374. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 8, § II.27, at 287 (stating that “every Man has a
Property in his own Person[]”); id. § II.34, at 291 (insisting that ownable resources are best
dedicated to the “use of the Industrious and Rational[]”).
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Ellickson and his article Property in Land.375 Ellickson makes his
transaction-cost-based justification for property contingent on three
rights-based claims: (1) people have rights to their persons; (2) people
deserve property in the things they make from their labor; and
(3) property rights entail liberties to alienate property.376 The
justifications for property rights developed in Parts II through V can
confirm and justify those assumptions.
Consider next Henry Smith’s approach to exclusion. Smith has
long stressed that his insights about information costs are compatible
with both utilitarian and nonutilitarian justifications for property.377
The account provided here confirms as much, within limits. On one
hand, productive labor theory’s claim-marking requirement provides
a basis in rights-based morality for most of what Smith says about
information costs.378 On the other hand, the responsibilities of owners
to use their possessions productively, and the sufficiency and
necessity provisos, impose broad outer limits on the situations when
information costs deserve to take priority. These limits lay the
foundations for limits on property, one presumes, reflected in the
governance-based limits Smith recognizes on exclusion.379
Productive labor theory can also complement consequentialist
theories justifying property rights. Productive labor theory reconciles
property rights to the common good, by justifying both in relation to
rational interests in survival and preservation. In principle, a theory of
consequentialism may make similar moves from social welfare to
individual rights; it could incorporate into social welfare profiles
individual normative claims relating to fairness, equality, or freedom.
In this spirit, Richard Epstein has proposed a hybrid form of
utilitarianism based on a “congruence” he sees “between natural law
and utilitarian theories on some of the key building blocks of our own
legal tradition,” including property rights.380 Some have wondered
whether Epstein’s account hangs together as a consequentialist
375. See Ellickson, supra note 4.
376. Id. at 1326 n.34.
377. See, e.g., JAMES PENNER & HENRY E. SMITH, Introduction to PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 14, at xxi (suggesting that productive labor
theory “might well have a tendency to converge with economic theories” of property);
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV.
965, 971 (2004) (arguing that “exclusionary rights can be justified on a number of grounds:
libertarianism, autonomy, personhood, desert, and so on” to include utilitarian grounds as
well).
378. See Smith, supra note 377, at 975–90.
379. See Smith, supra note 377, at 973; Smith, supra note 18, at S478–83.
380. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 11 (1999).
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theory.381 Because productive labor theory justifies property rights
and the public good in relation to interests in rational flourishing,382 it
may supply the reconciliation Epstein hopes to attain.
One way or another, productive labor theory may be able to give
an account of the reasons why economic defenses of property rights
have the sort of value justifying enforcing property in law. Labor
facilitates a form of preference-satisfaction within broad but firm
outer boundaries. As explained, in ordinary situations people should
have freedom to use resources for survival and their own reasonable
life goals.383 To the extent that people have preferences to acquire
property for these varied ends, their preferences deserve respect and
satisfaction. But productive labor theory imputes to citizens a “tacit
and voluntary consent” not to have other preferences: to enslave or
get priority over neighbors; to deploy resources idly or destructively;
to claim shares of resources inconsiderate of the just sufficiency and
necessity claims of others; or to take satisfaction from the legal
regime’s choking the productive use of resources.384
Similarly, productive labor theory facilitates a form of wealth
maximization. Although in principle it is “entirely a contingent
matter” whether “accumulation or industry are rational,” in practice
“by and large they are rational.”385 When a society creates new homes,
medicine, food, and life conveniences, it expands the range of things
with “usefulness to the Life of Man.”386 And when a society institutes
money and financial instruments, these instruments have moral value
insofar as they give people durable and respected mechanisms for
banking the potential to acquire things useful for their reasonable life
goals.
F.

Illustrations
1. Exclusive Property

This moral background supplies the premises needed to
strengthen economic justifications for exclusive property. When
exclusive property is said to generate “wealth,” that statement makes

381. See Henry E. Smith, Commentary, in PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER
RESOURCES 356, 357 (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2011) (casting doubts about
Epstein’s “[u]tilitarian-based natural law, if such a thing is possible”).
382. See supra Section II.A.
383. See supra Part II & Section VI.A.
384. See LOCKE, supra note 8, § 11.50, at 301–02.
385. BUCKLE, supra note 13, at 153.
386. LOCKE, supra note 8, §§ II.37, II.184, at 294, 391 (respectively).
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moral sense if it is understood as coarse and compressed shorthand
for a moral claim. As Part IV showed, exclusive property can, in
combination with contract and money, “over-ballance the
Community” of resources, by increasing the store “of things really
useful to the Life of Man . . . .”387 The moral claim makes clear,
however, commonly overlooked moral limits on “wealth-creation” or
“wealth-maximization.”388 As Part V showed, the fruits of increased
productivity need to be distributed consistent with the sufficiency
proviso, but when that constraint is satisfied property’s wealthcreating tendencies justify it. Similarly, exclusive property can
maximize the protection of subjective value—as long as “subjective
value” is understood to encompass activity consistent with the
sociable pursuit of survival or rational improvement, and not
destructive, idle, or selfish valuations on things.389 And “information
cost” minimization is relevant to property as well, as long as
information costs are understood as a compressed shorthand for the
claim-marking element, and suitably qualified for the sufficiency and
necessity claims of non-owners.390
So understood, productive labor theory also helps economic
analyses deal with hard preferences, like the preferences recounted of
aboriginals, communitarians, or antiproperty romantics.391 Citizens
like these are entitled to their preferences for their own ways of life.
They deserve equal opportunities to acquire property and manage the
property they acquire as common land for their own members. They
may not leverage their preferences into super-preferences, however,
so that the entire community’s system is structured to force or
incentivize other citizens to conform to their preferred methods of
living. The rest of the community has legitimate authority to disregard
those last preferences on the ground that they restrict free labor and
deny the rights of the rest of the citizenry.
2. Property Reassemblies
Similar arguments supply premises missing from economic
justifications for programs limiting exclusive property rights; again,
reassembly schemes illustrate this issue. Wealth enlargement and
maximization are much more defensible if understood as coarse and
compressed shorthand for a moral goal—increasing the opportunities
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Id. at §§ II.40, II.46, at 296, 299 (respectively).
See id.
See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section II.C–.D.
See supra Section VII.C.1.
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for all to acquire conveniences of life and labor productively. Some
American nuisance decisions have appealed to this principle,
especially undue hardship cases in which a court-ordered injunction
would shut down a town company.392 And some earlier public use and
police power decisions appealed to this principle as well, in cases
approving reclamation of swamp drainage projects and reassemblies
of land for irrigation projects and power mills.393 For example, one
leading U.S. Supreme Court case upheld a state law authorizing the
reorganization of land for power mills on this ground:
When property, in which several persons have a common
interest, cannot be fully and beneficially enjoyed in its existing
condition, the law often provides a way in which they may
compel one another to submit to measures necessary to secure
its beneficial enjoyment, making equitable compensation to any
whose control of or interest in the property is thereby
modified.394
Of course, the standards assumed in this passage are less
determinate than a standard like wealth-maximization. Yet those
standards are less determinate because they recognize important
moral limitations that are either assumed or disregarded by the
concept of wealth-maximization. If a reconfiguration of property
increases net wealth, that increase is helpful, but by no means
sufficient to justify the reconfiguration. Because any reconfiguration
disrupts conventional property rights, it bears a burden of satisfying
392. To explain how it would consider the relevant equities in the nuisance suit by
landowners against two nearby copper refineries, the court reasoned,
[I]n a case of conflicting rights, where neither party can enjoy his own without in
some measure restricting the liberty of the other in the use of property, the law
must make the best arrangement it can between the contending parties, with a
view to preserving to each one the largest measure of liberty possible under the
circumstances.
Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 667 (Tenn. 1904).
393. See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 157–64 (1896)
(upholding an irrigation project both on public use and reciprocity of advantage grounds);
Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606, 614 (1885) (upholding a state law authorizing state
geology surveyors to drain swamps and to assess affected owners for the expenses, as a
police regulation improving land); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 704
(1884) (declaring it “not open to doubt that it is in the power of the state to require local
improvements to be made which are essential to the health and prosperity of any
community[,]” and upholding a swamp reclamation project on this basis); Fiske v.
Framingham Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 68, 72–73 (1831) (upholding a mill act on the
ground that it facilitates the beneficial use of water courses, on condition that the act be
construed not to preempt other riparians’ common law actions for flooding).
394. Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 21 (1885).
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rights-based deontological limitations.395 Those limitations are easy to
satisfy when owners are making little or no beneficial use of the
property needed for reassembly—say, arid land that has not been
developed because it is not yet irrigated. The same limitations may
also be satisfied when it is practically impossible to generate a new
and more productive activity without reassembly. The Supreme
Court’s holding above captures that concern in power mill litigation—
especially in its statement that the mill “cannot be fully and
beneficially enjoyed in its existing condition.”396 In those latter cases
though, the government must not only certify that reassembly is
strictly necessary, but also ensure through generous compensation
that the ousted owners benefit from the reconfiguration. In the
passage just quoted, not “just” compensation but “equitable
compensation.”397
In short, although the foregoing criteria do take wealth
enlargement into account, they do so only as part of a more complex
moral calculus about how to enlarge opportunities to acquire and use
resources while respecting the freedom and the flourishing interests
of current owners. That same moral background fills in the context
lacking from terms like “subjective value” and “hold out.” These
terms make it sound as if regulators can decide which reassemblies to
authorize using a simple subtraction formula. The regulators should
authorize a project if all of its social benefits from a project are
greater than its subjective-value losses. Before conducting this
analysis, regulators should make sure that project opponents are
opposing the project sincerely and not holding out. This approach is
far more justifiable if “subjective values” and “hold-outs” are
understood in moral terms.
Imagine that a new power mill could not be built without ousting
a riparian. Imagine also that the riparian objected—not because he
was greedy, but because he opposed the mill for the same ideological,
“don’t tread on me,” class-based reasons that motivated Suzette Kelo
to object to eminent domain in her New London neighborhood.398 A
conscientious official could reasonably treat Kelo and the riparian
395. See supra Part V.
396. Head, 113 U.S. at 21.
397. See EPSTEIN, supra note 294, at 170–75 (analyzing public use challenges by
inquiring whether the surplus from property reorganization was distributed
proportionately among the parties affected by the reorganization); Claeys, supra note 294,
at 918–27 (analyzing public use challenges as police power challenges, and inquiring
whether the challenged laws secured an average reciprocity of advantage to parties
affected by the property reorganization).
398. See supra Section VII.C.2.
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differently. The official could classify Kelo as a “sincere dissenter”
protecting “subjective value” and the riparian as a “hold out.” Yet the
distinction between Kelo and the imagined riparian has nothing to do
with their actual motivations or preferences—by assumption, the
motivations and preferences are identical. Rather, the hypothetical
riparian would be a “holdout” even if she were not trying to
expropriate wealth from the mill company, because, in context, her
intentions and her rights claims would be extreme. It would not
matter how sincerely she opposed the mill. If a reasonable and social
onlooker were to agree that there was no means short of
condemnation to create the mill, that the community stood to benefit
from the mill, and that the authorities were taking every reasonable
step to protect the flourishing interests beneath her property rights,
the riparian would be a “holdout” simply by virtue of objecting to a
project increasing opportunities throughout the community. By
contrast, Kelo could still be a “sincere dissenter” protecting
“subjective value” because she is asserting her rights in a context in
which a reasonable and sociable onlooker would conclude that
condemnation is not so strictly necessary that it justifies overriding
the ordinary presumption that owners should be free to use their own
lots for their own goals. Here, productive labor theory again
complements economic accounts of land assembly by supplying moral
assumptions under which economic analyses could be politically
legitimate.
CONCLUSION
In his contribution to the 2009 Symposium on Progressive
Property, Gregory Alexander concluded, “American property law is
not solely about either individual freedom or cost-minimization.”399
Productive labor theory confirms as much. But it provides an
alternative considerably different from the understandings of
freedom, cost-minimization, and progressive values on display in
current scholarship.
Productive labor theory supplies a rights-based theory of
property that does not receive adequate appreciation. Productive
labor theory presents not a theory of autonomy but of liberty ordered
to facilitate flourishing. Flourishing, productive labor, sufficiency,
sociability, and equal opportunity supply a normative framework for
reasoning about exclusive rights and use-based needs, and this

399. Alexander, supra note 67, at 818.
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framework puts cost-minimization and other consequentialist
concerns in their proper contexts.
This justification supplies property with a normative foundation
more satisfying than it currently has. To exclusion theorists,
productive labor theory provides a friendly reminder of the questions
that still need to be answered about the link between efficiency and
property law—but it also supplies answers to those questions. To
progressive theorists, productive labor theory offers a friendly
warning: flourishing can work not only to justify property, but also to
destabilize it and encourage aggressive political infighting around it.
Here too, productive labor theory offers a solution: progressives may
be able to agree that property consists of a general and indirect right
of exclusive control, which may be limited when strong flourishingbased interests so suggest.
Productive labor theory will not answer every question about
property law. Yet it is instructive that an old account of property
manages to be both durable and relevant to contemporary scholars’
questions. And maybe that account can keep property on sturdier
foundations than those on which it has rested in recent scholarship.

